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~~MACSOG~~ DOCUMENTATION STUDY (U)

~~APPENDIX C~~

MACSOG OPERATIONS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM

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~~B. MACSOG~~
~~F. CINCPAC~~
~~G. COMUSMACV~~

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APPENDIX C

MACSOG OPERATIONS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM (TS)

PART I. INTRODUCTION (U)

A. (TS) ~~SCOPE~~

1. (TS) Organization. Appendix C presents Military Assistance Command, Studies and Observation Group (MACSOG) operations against North Vietnam from their beginning in January 1964 through June 1969. The appendix presents an overview of the entire program, including background, policy, and evaluation. This general section is supported by annexes which describe in detail the four sub-programs: Psychological Operations, Airborne/ Agent Team Operations, Air Operations, and Maritime Operations.

2. (TS) Code Words. From the program's inception until 3 February 1967, code words were not assigned. The overall program against the North was referred to as 34A, after the number of its implementing operation order, and the separate programs within 34A were identified by their descriptive titles, as noted in the preceding paragraph. The new assignments were:

<u>Previous Term</u>	<u>Code Word</u>
34A	FOOTBOY (C)
PsyOps	HUMIDOR (C)
Airborne/Agent Team Ops	TIMBERWORK (C)
AirOps	COACHDOG (C)/MIDRIFF (C)/SHEDDER (C)*
MAROPS	FLOWMAN (C)/PARBOIL (C)*

A complete list of code words and nick names used in MACSOG operations against North Vietnam can be seen at TAB 1 to this appendix of this volume.

3. (C) Footnotes and Files. Footnotes for a given page are listed the text material. Files to support each portion of the appendix have been prepared and placed in

* Original replacement and current code word.

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the Special Operations Division office of the Special Assistant
 for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA).

~~B. (TS) BACKGROUND~~

1. (TS) CINCPAC Plan. Military planning for covert actions against North Vietnam commenced on 23 May 1963. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in a memorandum* "Military Operations in North Vietnam (U)" advised the Secretary of Defense that plans for covert hit and run operations would be developed for implementation by the South Vietnam forces under the guidance of the US military, and with the assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). CINCPAC was assigned the responsibility for developing a plan, which upon completion was entitled CINCPAC OPLAN 34-63. The plan was favorably endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 14 August 1963.**

a. CIA Reaction. CIA in reviewing the CINCPAC plan agreed with the desirability of the hit-and-run raid operations against North Vietnam, but suggested, counter to the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that it would be more effective to augment the current CIA effort than to inaugurate a separate military action by the Republic of Vietnam. However, CIA expressed willingness to review its present position when the Agency received the detailed target plans that were being prepared.**

b. Unstable RVN Government. The need for early coordination and support from the RVN Government for the plan was counter-balanced by the unstable condition of the relationships between the United States and the Diem regime at this time.** This instability persisted throughout the fall and winter months and delayed bringing the RVN into the planning process until the very eve of the commencement of operations on 1 February 1964.

* (TS) Memo, JCS to SECDEF, JCSM-398-63, 23 May 1963.

** (TS) JCS 2054/611-2, "CINCPAC OPLAN 34-63", 14 Aug 63 (SACSA).

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c. SECDEF Views. Secretary McNamara's views on the CINCPAC OPLAN were presented in a draft memorandum to the Secretary of State.* He felt that North Vietnam had enjoyed for some time relative immunity from any substantial penalty for its part in the insurgency in South Vietnam. He contended that the CIA operations in progress were not cast on a large enough scale to constitute a serious problem for the northern regime. By bringing in South Vietnamese armed forces, advised by the United States and assisted by CIA, a level of hit-and-run attacks against the North could be attained that would make it clear to the leaders of the North that they would suffer serious reprisals for their continuing support of the insurgency in South Vietnam. Also mentioned in this memorandum was the desired development of a Vietnamese "national liberation movement" which would be the ostensible sponsor of the operations.

2. (TS) Honolulu Meeting. The next major step was taken as part of the Honolulu executive session on 20 November 1963. The Secretary of Defense and the Director, CIA, ordered a combined plan be developed by COMUSMACV and CAS which would provide for an intensified program of action against North Vietnam.**

a. The Plan. On 15 December 1963, "COMUSMACV OPLAN 34A-64 CAS Saigon OPLAN TIGER" was issued. CINCPAC forwarded the plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 19 December 1963, recommending approval for the 12-month program.***

b. Interdepartmental Committee. On 21 December, the Secretary of Defense brought OPLAN 34A-64 to the attention of the President and recommended that he form an interdepartmental committee

* (TS) Ibid.

** (TS) MSG, JCS to CINCPAC, DTG 261437Z N63.

*** (TS) Ltr, CINCPAC to JCS, "Combined MACV/CAS Saigon Plan for Actions Against VN", Ser: 000465, 19 Dec 1963.

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with representatives from State, Defense, JCS, and CIA to
 examine the plan and recommend appropriate action. The com-
 mittee report of 2 January 1964 analyzed the various proposed
 operation of the Saigon plan and outlined schedule of three
 phases of four months each to cover the 12-month period. The
 intensity of destruction was to increase with each successive
 phase with the purpose of causing reorientation of current
 North Vietnamese policies.*

c. Implementation. The program was formally implemented
 by a joint State-DOD-CAS message on 19 January 1964.** The
 recommendations of the interdepartmental committee had been
 approved by the President for actions covering the first four-
 month period, 1 February-31 May 1964. The actions selected
 from the Saigon plan were those considered most feasible, and
 which promised the greatest return for the least risk. All
 approved actions would be plausibly denied by the US Government.
 The views of the committee on deniability by GVN was that
 certain actions would be more effective if acknowledged by GVN.
 The views of CINCPAC were requested on this subject.**

d. Formation of MACSOG. The Special Operations Group (SOG)
 was formally activated on 24 January 1964 by USMACV General
 Order No. 6, as a separate staff section under COMUSMACV.
 For cover purposes, the organization was redesignated as Studies
 and Observations Group, with no change in its functions, in
 late 1964.

* (TS) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 3 Jan 69.

** (TS) Msg, State-DOD-CAS, 94963, 19 January 1964 (SACSA).

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PART II. 34A/FOOTBOY PROGRAM AN OVERVIEW (C)

A. (TS) GENERAL

The paragraphs that follow in Part II introduce the 34A program by summarizing the significant features of the original Saigon OP-Order. With this background, the evolution of the program over the years is traced and the command and control/clearance procedures are outlined. Finally, the present status of and constraints on the program are described.

B. (TS) RATIONALE FOR THE PROGRAM1. (TS) OPLAN 34A

a. Objective. The aim of the plan was: "in concert with other military and diplomatic actions in the Southeast Asia area, to convince the DRV leadership that its current support and direction of war in the Republic of Vietnam and its aggression in Laos should be reexamined and stopped. Since what we are seeking is a change in the political calculations of the DRV, the plan provides means for the development and support of a broad spectrum of operations in and against North Vietnam in direct retaliation to DRV aggressive moves."*

b. Concept of Operations. Operations were to consist of selective actions in four categories. Operations were planned for a 12-month period under conditions short of limited war. The plan was to be conducted in concert with other military, political and military actions in Southeast Asia. The four levels of activity envisioned by the plan are briefly described below:

(1) Category I - Harrassing. "Included are small unspectacular demolition operations, moderate level psychological operations, small-scale intelligence collection actions including tactical reconnaissance probes by small military

* (TS) COMUSMACV OPLAN 34A-64 CAS/Saigon OPLAN TIGER, 15 December 1963, p.2. (SACSA)

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* (TS) COMUSMACV OPLAN 34A-64 CAS/Saigon OPLAN TIGER, 15 December 1963, p.2. (SACSA)

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units to obtain visual ground intelligence, capture of
 prisoners, documents and equipment, creation of general
 harassment, and temporary interdiction of lines of communica-
 tion."* The expected reaction was to cause an awareness
 of opposition, embarrassing irritation, possible interruption
 to movement of material, and increased readiness of
 Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) forces. No major
 retaliation to Category I activities was expected.

(2) Category II - Attritional. "Included are small-scale
 resistance operations, airborne and seaborne raids by small
 forces on important military and civilian installations, and
 demolition of important facilities."** The goal of these
 operations was to pose a clear threat of attrition to the
 physical facilities, security forces and the popular image
 of the DRV leadership. Reaction was expected in the form of
 retaliation by Viet Cong (VC) forces in South Vietnam (SVN) and
 request for aid from Communist China.

(3) Category III - Punitive. "These are covert/overt
 resistance/physical destruction actions designed to cause
 damage and/or destruction to facilities or installations
 critical to the economy, industrial development and security
 of the DRV. They are designed to cause large-scale internal
 redeployment of DRV resources and commitment of forces in
 reaction."*** Actions included raids by company and battalion
 size forces, covert where possible, but attributable to
 Republic of Vietnam (RVN) if they became overt. Operations
 were to be of a magnitude requiring positive and serious measures
 by DRV to counteract their effects. Retaliation to these
 operations was expected to range from increased insurgency
 efforts in RVN/Laos to overt aggression by DRV with Chinese
 support.

* (TS) Ibid., p.4.
 ** (TS) Ibid., p.5.
 *** (TS) Ibid., p.6.

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(4) Category IV - Aerial Attacks. "These are aerial attacks conducted against critical DRV installations or facilities, industrial and/or military, such as POL storage areas, thermal power and steel plants, the loss of which would result in crippling effect on the DRV potential to maintain a stable economy and progress in industrial development."* The reaction to these operations was dependent on two major factors: (a) the willingness of DRV to accept significant damage to its homeland in order to continue the war in the south, and (b) the reaction and influence of the Chinese Peoples Republic. It was considered that operations in this category could well escalate the conflict, rather than convince the DRV continuance of the war was unprofitable, and that the United States must be "prepared to follow up with supporting operations in offsetting DRV reactions."*

c. Coordination.* Coordination with the Government of Vietnam (GVN) was not achieved during formulation of the OPLAN. This was to be effected by COMUSMACV/Chief of Station, CAS, Saigon, after the plan was approved. US forces were not to be used for operations within the DRV, its territorial waters or air space except as air crews on reconnaissance missions.

d. Resources.** In-country resources available or programmed were considered adequate for most of Category I through IV operations. Specific requirements were listed in Annex A to the OPLAN; general requirements were: (1) NASTY class PTFs must be in-country and operational, (2) electronic countermeasures (ECM) configuration of six additional C-123 aircraft, (3) augmentation of personnel necessary to organize and activate the implementing agency, (4) psychological warfare (PSYWAR) augmentation detachment, (5) availability of two portable beacon type navigational

* (TS) Ibid., p.7-8.
 ** (TS) Ibid., p.A1.

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aids, (6) five radio broadcast studios for conduct of overt
 and "black" radio operations, (7) aircrews trained in technique
 of allied mine laying, and (8) installation of flare dispensers
 for aircraft. An additional resource was considered to be
 the 800,000 refugees from the DRV, including Meo, Black Thai
 and Nung tribesmen from which it was believed a few thousand
 could be picked and successfully trained for special operations.*

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e. Operations. Five types of operations were planned and
 are briefly described below:

(1) Intelligence Collection. Operations conducted with
 primary mission of intelligence collection. Included were:
 (a) continue and expand CAS intelligence efforts, (b) expand
 photo reconnaissance, (c) implement COMINT/SIGINT/ELINT
 operations, (d) expand Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF)
 tactical intelligence missions, (e) assign secondary missions
 of intelligence to other operations in NVN, (f) intensify
 intelligence collection probes into the DMZ area.*

(2) Psychological. "Strategic and tactical psychological
 operations targeted against the DRV leadership and the
 populace, and will use all available media (leaflets, radio,
 mail) techniques and tactics to help achieve maximum harass-
 ment, division, and the establishment of resistance within
 the DRV."**

(3) Political Pressure. Operations designed to impart to
 the DRV leaders that DRV direction and support of aggression
 in RVN and Laos must cease, or further and more damaging
 retaliatory action would be taken against NVN. Examples of
 these operations were: a series of studied leaks in the
 news media, or actions in the United Nations.**

* (TS) Ibid., p.A-1, B-1.
 ** (TS) Ibid., p.B-2.

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* (TS) Ibid., p.B-2.

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(4) Resistance. "These operations are designed to create pressure on the DRV through the development of organized guerrilla activity in the tribal highland as well as unorganized resistance in the more populous lowlands."*

(5) Physical Destruction. "These are military hit-and-run paramilitary long-term team operations and air attacks with objectives ranging from destruction of military assets to destruction of major DRV economic assets."*

f. Program of Operations. Seventy-two actions were planned over the 12-month period covered by the plan. The types of operations and number in each category are summarized below.*

No.	Type	Category			
		I	II	III	IV
4	Intell. Collection	4			
24	Psychological	14	8	2	
33	Physical Destruction	10	16	7	
11	Aerial Attacks				11

g. Enemy Vulnerability. As contrasted to VC assets in the south, which were difficult to fix and attack, the tangible assets of the DRV were considered well known and static. "Successful offensive operations will inflict moderate to severe damage to certain of these facilities which would hinder, to a limited extent, planned economic development, harass the DRV and remove from it the immunity from attack it currently enjoys. However, such raids would not result in economic chaos or ruin since the DRV is 90 percent an underdeveloped agricultural state nor would the military capability of the DRV be substantially downgraded."**

h. Command and Control. When written, 15 December 1963, the shape and form of the implementing agency had not been resolved. The OPLAN suggests three alternatives for implementing the program: (1) Either CAS or COMUSMACV with the second party

* (TS) Ibid., p.B-3, C-1 to C-5-1.
 ** (TS) Ibid., p.D-1.

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providing the required support, (2) a joint MACV/CAS command,
or (3) the program can be divided between CAS and COMUSMACV.**

2. (TS) OPLAN 34A Review

a. COMUSMACV Comments. In his letter of transmittal,**
General Harkins (COMUSMACV) outlined some of the shortfalls,
weaknesses, and implications involving the United States inherent
in the plan. They were:

(1) Successful implementation of the complete 12-month
program would require optimum conditions of weather, internal
GVN stability, and bloc reaction. A reduction due to
these and other factors up to 50 percent would not be
unrealistic.

(2) Initiation of physical destruction operations may
escalate the war.

(3) The inherent high loss factor in operations of this
type must be weighed against the benefits expected including
strengthening the noncommunist countries in Asia, improving
RVN morale, and weakening the communist bloc posture.

(4) The GVN position on the plan had not been determined.
The United States must be prepared to continue the program
beyond the initial 12-month period if full support of GVN
is to be gained.

b. CINCPAC Comments. Admiral Felt, in his endorsement,
emphasized that the "US Government should be prepared to back
up the GVN and be willing to commit US forces in the event
reaction from DRV and CHICOMs escalates to a magnitude beyond
RVN capabilities."*** In his opinion, however, the Category I
and II actions, even if all were successfully executed, would
not convince the DRV to cease its support of insurgent activi-
ties in the south. The air attacks against selected targets

* (TS) Ibid., P.E-1.

** (TS) Ltr, COMUSMACV to Distribution, "Operations in North
Vietnam (S)", ser 00071, 15 Dec 1963.

*** (TS) Ltr, CINCPAC to JCS, "Combined MACV-CAS Saigon Plan for
Actions against NV," ser: 000465, 19 Dec 1963, p.1.

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*** (TS) Ltr, CINCPAC to JCS, "Combined MACV-CAS Saigon Plan for

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in Category IV appeared to him to have the highest probability
of influencing the DRV leadership. He outlined three problems
in implementing the plan.

(1) "Difficulty in maintaining denial of US participation.

(2) "Difficulty in establishing a planning and control
organization.

(3) "Difficulty in the RVNAF carrying out above operations
and still carrying on with war at home."*

In summary, Admiral Felt was doubtful that the plan would achieve
its aim unless it were expanded to include overt US combat support,
particularly naval and air support.*

c. Washington Review. The review in Washington by an Inter-
Departmental Committee was described in Part I of this volume.
Part IV (Operations Summary) analyzes actions proposed in the
OPLAN, actions authorized by the Interdepartmental Committee,
and actions actually completed.

C. (TS) POLICY EVOLUTION

1. (TS) Initial Policy and Constraints

a. Control. The OPLAN 34A authors left the question of
command and control for later decision. The State-DOD-CAS
implementing message** resolved the question as follows:

(1) Overall political control - Ambassador.

(2) Overall operational control - COMUSMACV.

(3) Planning, liaison, logistics, training and advice -
Joint MACV-CAS Task Force reporting to MACV with a colonel
as Chief and a CAS officer as his deputy.

The message also directed Saigon to bring the GVN into the planning
on a discrete basis since their forces would actually conduct
the operations. On 21 January, Ambassador Lodge briefed
President Minh on 34A operations, stating that the plan had been
approved at high levels of the US Government and was now ready for
GVN review and, hopefully, early agreement and implementation.

* (TS) Ibid., p.6.

** (TS) Msg, State-DOD-CAS, 94963, 19 Jan 1964 (SACSA).

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b. Operations and Evaluation. Operations were functionally
divided by SOG into four sections: Psychological, Airborne,
Air, and Maritime (see supporting annexes). On the 33
approved actions in Phase I, 22 had not been completed by 1 June.*
The lack of early success and progress was noted by Secretary
McNamara in March when he requested JCS and CINCPAC's views
on improving the program in several critical areas.** The
views of CINCPAC and COMUSMACV were summarized in a SACSA
memorandum*** to the Secretary of Defense which included the
following points:

(1) CINCPAC stated that:

"The physical destruction operations approved to date
were not sure things when the plan was written and
approved. The increased state of alert of the DRV,
lack of detailed intelligence and instability of the
GVN have further decreased the chance of success for
these operations. The simple way is to conduct air
strikes and aerial mining."***

(2) Limited time since activation of SOG. SOG was formed
on 24 January and the Vietnamese counterpart (STS) even
later on 12 February.

(3) Lack of motivation of maritime and air operational
teams. Failures and losses in these operations has com-
pounded the major problem of recruiting high calibre personnel.

(4) Bad weather and marginal capability of Chinese
C-123 crews has been responsible for poor showing in air
operations.

(5) Non-availability of major equipment items, including
boats, aircraft and radio equipment.

(6) Lack of adequate intelligence.

(7) Lack of security in RVN activities.

(8) Tighter NVN defense.

* (TS) Memo, General Anthis to Col Moody, "Operations Against
North Vietnam (OPLAN 34A)", 5 June 1964 (SACSA).

** (TS) Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 262339Z Mar 1964.

*** (TS) Memo, General Anthis to SECDEF, "OPLAN 34A," 3 Apr 1964
(SACSA).

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(9) A related problem was procurement of personnel to man
SOG. A JTD had been submitted for [REDACTED] (137 military
and [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] the major problem was to fill the other US spaces
with properly trained personnel.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

c. Phase II. Military planning for Phase II operations was
completed in May.* Although the program had a slow start,
it was the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that attempts
at infiltration and psychological activities were having an
effect on the DRV. It was believed that Hanoi was expending
substantial resources in defensive measures. An intensified
program was recommended for Phase II as operational capabilities
were demonstrated. Thirteen uncompleted actions of Phase I
were authorized and eight destructive maritime and airborne
operations were proposed. The interdepartmental committee
disapproved the recommendation to aerial mine SWATOW bases
using unmarked aircraft and non-US crews. The committee also
disapproved the proposals for SOG to develop Meo/non-Meo
guerrilla resistance cadres and to interdict Route 7. These
actions were referred to CIA for responsibility.** COMUSMACV
by message*** strongly objected to CIA being given responsibility
for 34A actions other than in support of SOG as outlined in the
implementing instructions. A JCS message**** to CINCPAC in
August described efforts being made at the highest level to
clarify the command and control confusion introduced into 34A
operations by the committee assigning CIA separate responsibility
for certain Phase II operations. The essentials of the JCS proposal
were that MACV would retain full operational control of 34A

* (TS) JCS 2343/361, "Operational Planning-Vietnam (U)",
13 May 1964
** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 122101Z June 1964
*** (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV 280351Z June 1964
**** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 131727Z Aug 64

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actions with coordination and support of CAS. However, the
 problem of coordination between SOG and CAS continued
 through 1965 and into 1966.* SOG's requests for aid and
 coordination in moving teams into the area along Route 7
 were objected to by CAS on the basis that this area had been
 assigned to CAS in the Phase II approval message. In late
 1965, controversy developed when MACV reported CAS operations
 in DRV with no prior coordination with MACV.** CINCPAC in
 commenting on the MACV message recommended that:

"Consultation be held with CAS Washington to insure that all
 covert...operations against DRV are under the authority of
 the Joint Military/CAS task force established under COMUSMACV
 by original OPLAN 34A authority."***

d. Early Clearance Procedures. Clearance procedures were
 highly centralized throughout 1964. In addition to the
 detailed review at the Washington level of Phase I and II
 proposals, COMUSMACV was required to submit a monthly schedule
 of 34A actions for comment by CINCPAC and approval at the
 Washington level. The clearance procedure in effect in
 October 1964 was summarized in a JCS message as follows:

- "(1) MACV submit monthly schedule.
- "(2) This schedule as modified by CINCPAC's comments
 is submitted for high level approval.
- "(3) When obtained, this approval represents final
 Washington authority for missions; however, MACV must obtain
 24-hour prior political clearance each mission from AMEMB
 Saigon and at the same time provide intentions to JCS where
 Washington-level notification will be accomplished.
- "(4) MACV continue to submit launch, recovery, abort, and
 spot reports."****

The Gulf of Tonkin incident, 4 August 1964, terminated Phase II
 operations; plans for Phase III were never completed. When
 operations were resumed in October, it was stipulated that

- * (TS) Memo, SACSA, "Chronology" undated (SACSA).
- ** (TS) Msg, MACV, DTG 270327Z Dec 65.
- *** (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 010009Z Jan 66.
- **** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 092026Z Oct 64 (SACSA).

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operations would be considered on a monthly basis and each maritime 1
 operation would be approved on a case-by-case basis.* Monthly 2
 schedules were prepared and submitted for October and 3
 November; however, a memorandum in the November file notes 4
 that the November program was never approved completely by the 5
 DEPSECDEF and that approval was gained in a case-by-case basis.** 6
 In October, JCS reduced the lead time in the intent message from 7
 24 hours to 12 hours*** in response to MACV's insistence that 8
 the 24-hour requirement was unrealistic. 9

2. (TS) Evolution of Mission 10

a. Increased Mission and Scope. As a result of a trip to 11
 Vietnam 5-12 March 1965 by the Chief of Staff, Army, it was 12
 recommended inter alia, that the tempo and scope of SOG activities 13
 be increased. This recommendation was approved by the President 14
 on 15 March and CINCPAC was requested to present proposals.**** 15
 CINCPAC in his reply# proposed to increase the tempo of air 16
 operations and maritime operations and, in addition, proposed 17
 three new concepts for Washington approval: (1) Recruit and support 18
 assets in the DRV for resistance, guerrilla warfare, evasion and 19
 escape and intelligence collection, (2) Use US submarines for 20
 delivery and recovery of OPLAN 34A agent teams and raiding 21
 parties, and (3) Use US manned C-130s for OPLAN 34A missions. 22
 All of these concepts were approved by the JCS##; however, Secretary 23
 Vance was unable to gain the concurrence of the State Department 24
 on proposals (2) and (3) and so informed CJCS on 5 June 1965.### 25

* (TS) White House/State/OSD Meeting 1 October 1964.

** (TS) Memo for the Record, "JCS 2343/482", 24 Jan 1966 (SACSA).

*** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 211800Z Oct 64, (SACSA).

**** (TS) Msg, JCS DTG 200019Z Mar 65 (SACSA).

(TS) Msg, CINCPAC, 270317Z Mar 65 (SACSA).

(TS) JCS 2343/555 "Increase Tempo and Scope 34A", 29 Mar 65 (SACSA)

(TS) Memo, DEPSECDEF to CJCS, "Increase Tempo and Scope of OPLAN 34A (U)", 5 June 1965, (SACSA).

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CINCPAC was informed* of this decision and in September, after
discussions on the interdepartmental level, the proposal
recruit assets for resistance and guerrilla warfare was also
disapproved.** (For further discussion of resistance movement,
see Annex A) Authority was given to recruit
and support assets for evasion and escape and intelligence
collection missions.**

b. Intelligence Emphasis. At approximately the same time as
overt air strikes (ROLLING THUNDER) against the North were
commenced, the primary mission of OPLAN 34A operations was changed
from punitive operations to those operations more closely designed
o provide intelligence information concerning NVN. This change
was never formally addressed at the Washington level, but all
parties concurred in the various proposals by COMUSMACV and
CINCPAC to reorient the program. It was evident that the
ROLLING THUNDER strikes were more effective in punitive action
than OPLAN 34A.***

(1) Agent Operations and Maritime Operations. By late
summer 1965, both team operations and the maritime operations
(MAROPS) were engaged in actions designed to improve the
intelligence information from NVN. New team members
were inserted who were trained in reporting and road watching
functions. The MAROPS PTFs were employed in
shipping interdiction missions that provided information
from the interrogation of NVN fishermen captured
from junks and sampans. This information, while low-level,
provided the only information concerning internal NVN activities.***

(2) DIA Interest. In September 1965, the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency (DIA) became interested in OPLAN 34A assets for
intelligence collection and reporting. DIA stated that they had

* (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 051434Z Jun 65 (SACSA).

** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 24135Z Sep 65 (SACSA).

*** (TS) Memo, SACSA, "Overview of Operation Plan 34A
Operations," undated (SACSA).

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ascertained that currently existing DOD collections assets could not provide the broad coverage of detailed information required concerning North Vietnamese military capabilities. They further stated that a definite requirement existed to use OPLAN 34A assets to acquire intelligence on covert military buildup and military capabilities (including SA-2 missile sites) in North Vietnam.*

(3) FIAB. Further interest in the program was evinced in October 1965 when the President's Foreign Intelligence Board (FIAB) members requested an oral briefing concerning the OPLAN 34A assets and capabilities targeted against North Vietnam.*

c. CINCPAC OPODER. The revised OPLAN 34A**, issued in October of 1965, took account of the change in emphasis and re-oriented operations primarily towards intelligence collection, psychological operations, and escape and evasion. It also authorized the recruiting by 34A teams of local agents in NVN for intelligence and E&E nets. Physical destruction operations were authorized against selected targets providing security of intelligence and E&E nets was not jeopardized. Maritime PTF boats were directed to stop and board DRV shipping above the 17th Parallel. Ships with military cargo were to be sunk and crews captured for psychological/intelligence exploitation. Psychological operations were to include leaflet and gift kit delivery, capture of prisoners, and black/white radio broadcasts.

d. New Mission Statement. A new SOG mission statement*** was approved by CINCPAC in November 1965. There was concern in JCS**** on two counts concerning the new mission: (1) the original mission

* (TS) Memo, SACSA, "Overview of Operation Plan 34A Operations," undated (SACSA).
 ** (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 300241Z Oct 65 (SACSA).
 *** (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 182128Z Nov 65 (SACSA).
 **** (TS) Memo, SACSA, "Change in Statement of Mission (U)," 22 Nov 1965 (SACSA).

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had been promulgated under a joint DOD-State-CAS message while 1
the revision had been approved by CINCPAC without departmental 2
coordination, and (2) the new mission gave SOG a major expansion 3
of command and control by extending operations from NVN only to all 4
out-of-country unconventional and psychological warfare 5
activities. 6

e. The salient differences in the two mission statements 7
are set forth below: 8

OriginalRevised

(1) Overall political control
in Saigon - Ambassador.

(1) ...with the concurrence of US
Embassy.

(2) Overall operational control - COMUSMACV.

(2) COMUSMACV will exercise his
operational control through the
normal MACV command channels. Normal
staff relationships pertain. In
conjunction with CAS and as
directed by CINCPAC, MACV will
advise, train and support RVN
military and paramilitary forces
in out-of-country unconventional
and psychological warfare activities,
and will exercise operational
control of SOG assets.

Planning, liaison, logistics,
training and advice - joint
MACV/CAS Task Force, reporting
directly to COMUSMACV. Chief of
Task Force to be a Colonel level
military officer selected by
COMUSMACV; Deputy Chief of Task
Force to be a CAS officer to be
selected by CAS Chief, Saigon.

(3) All operations against North
Vietnam will be under the Task
Force described above, and all
in-country resources of the US
Military and CAS will be available
for support of approved operations.

(3) As directed by COMUSMACV and
with the concurrence of the US
Embassy, SOG will advise, train,
and support counterpart force in
out-of-country unconventional
warfare and psychological warfare
operations.

(4)

(4) SOG will conduct unilateral
planning for unconventional warfare
activities under existing
COMUSSEASIA plans, and will be
prepared when directed to activate
and command the JUWTF, SEASIA.

(5) Concurred in by State/
DOD and CAS.

(5) Noted by the Ambassador.*

The anticipated interdepartmental problems over the new mission 9
apparently did not materialize because the 15 month SOG program 10
promulgated the following June used the revised mission statement. 11

* (TS) Ibid.

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f. 15-Month Plan. In April 1966, CINCPAC directed COMUSMACV
to prepare a 15-month plan of SOG missions, objectives and
programs.* This document reflected the change in emphasis in
the program in these words:

"As originally conceived, airborne operations in NVN were intended to build a resistance movement which would exert pressure against the NVN Government, divert resources and make continuous support of the war in RVN less attractive. The resistance idea was never warmly received by the State Department and, owing to control procedures in Washington, the resistance mission was never specifically given to SOG. Consequently, airborne operations were conducted during the first 1 1/2 years on ambiguously worded mission statements which generally amounted to permission to conduct sabotage, interdiction and harassment in NVN without civilian contacts. Each operation was to be approved in Washington on a case-by-case basis. Early in 1965, DIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff began to express concern over the intelligence available in NVN, especially in regard to early warning of CHICOM intervention, infiltration into RVN, and Soviet and CHICOM military aid to NVN. The requirements for this intelligence resulted in the Joint Chiefs of Staff studying the capability of SOG to obtain it. There were, at that time, six agent teams in NVN: ARES, BELL, EAGLE, EASY, REMUS, and TOURBILLON. During mid-1965, SOG began to reorient and revitalize its operations in order to provide clear-cut objectives related to the strategy of the war in RVN and Laos, and to develop a logical program for attaining these objectives. It was determined that maximum emphasis should be placed upon intelligence collection and establishment of civilian contacts with secondary emphasis on psychological operations, escape and evasion and sabotage."**

Team training and composition was modified to meet the revised
priorities.

g. STRATA Concept. To support the need for intelligence
gathering, the Short-Term Roadwatch and Target Acquisition (STRATA)
team concept*** was developed in early 1967. The concept of
operations involved the employment in NVN of five to 15-man
indigenous teams for a stay time of 15-30 days. Teams were to be
trained in roadwatching techniques, employment of technical
sensors, target acquisition and forward air guide procedures.

h. Revised OP Order. A new CINCPAC basic operation**** order
for FOOTBOY was promulgated in April of 1967 and listed the
following program objectives:

- * (TS) Msg, CINCPAC to MACV, 030153Z Apr 66 (SACSA).
- ** (TS) "Missions, Objectives, Programs FY 4/66-FY 4/67," MACSOG, Apr 1966, p.6-7 (SACSA).
- *** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 071804Z Apr 67.
- **** (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 252340Z Apr 67.

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- (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 071804Z Apr 67.
- **** (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 252340Z Apr 67.

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- (1) Increase US capability to collect strategic and tactical intelligence in NVN.
 - (2) Impede the infiltration of enemy resources into RVN.
 - (3) Foment dissatisfaction with NVN Government policy.
 - (4) Divert NVN military resources to defense and internal security missions.
 - (5) Produce an adverse effect on NVN economy.
 - (6) Increase psychological pressure on NVN by creating the impression that internal opposition exists in NVN.
- A change to the Op order, promulgated in May*, added the STRATA concept as an OP 34A mission.

1. New SOG Program. With the Op-Order for guidance, SOG published, in May 1967, its proposed FOOTBOY program for FY 1968. A brief review of the more significant areas of emphasis and policy change are covered in the following paragraphs.**

(1) The US policy did not admit to the possible overthrow of the NVN Government as a means of achieving success in SVN. This policy was based on the fear of Communist China intervention and the fear that a growing resistance movement might not be controlled if the NVN Government should suddenly desire to negotiate a settlement. It was the belief of MACSOG that the above restrictions would be lifted during FY 1968 because of the impatience and pressure within the United States to use additional actions to bring the war to a conclusion.

(2) The selection and retention of properly motivated agents was a continuing problem. Candidates being trained at Camp Long Thanh had neither the educational or psychological makeup to fit them for the intended missions. Incentives, primarily financial, were insufficient. The inability to

* (TS) MSG, CINCPAC, DTG 272136Z May 67 (SACSA).

** (TS) MACSOG, "FOOTBOY (C) FY 1968 Program (C)." 10 May 1967 (SACSA).

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successfully exfiltrate teams from NVN was considered
highly adverse to the morale of the entire team program.

(3) The level of maritime operations would be dependent
on the number of PT boats available. The fiscal year was
commenced with only 50 percent of the authorized number
of boats (14).

(4) Psychological operations were to be increased in
all areas.

J. Reorientation of FOOTBOY (C)

"In order to exploit the demonstrated vulnerabilities of the Vietnamese people and the Hanoi regime, while minimizing the expenditure of human resources, the FOOTBOY (C) program commenced a gradual reorientation in late 1967. The reorientation involved the continuation of efforts to collect the best intelligence information possible within the limitations imposed by the resources available and the environment in NVN while at the same time, emphasizing efforts to exploit psychological vulnerabilities. The latter efforts included a fuller integration of all operations around the central theme provided by the existence of the notional SSPL, increased use of deceptive operations to include in Hanoi a belief that extensive agent operations are being conducted in NVN and the gradual inducement of the North Vietnamese population to adopt a posture of non-cooperation with the regime and particularly with the middle and low-level cadres. The ultimate objective of the reorientation was to employ psychological impact on both the regime itself and on the population to create a situation in which the regime perceived a significant threat to its control of the NVN population as a result of its war policies."*

3. (TS) Clearance Procedures: Command and Control

a. Background. Clearance procedures through Phase I and II
planning and through the fall months of 1964 were covered earlier
in this appendix. On 12 December 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
recommended that the Secretary of Defense approve maritime
packages of approximately five missions for execution at CINCPAC's
discretion. The proposal was approved on 14 December by the
Secretary of Defense and authority dispatched to CINCPAC.**

* (TS) Background paper, SACSA, "FOOTBOY (C) - Covert Operations
Against North Vietnam (TS)," 9 May 1968.

** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 151627Z Dec 64.

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b. Consolidation. In January 1965, SACSA consolidated all 34A operations procedures into a single message.* The message codified procedures currently in effect, as developed over the first year of operations.

(1) Air Operations. A 30-day package was required from COMUSMACV to Washington via CINCPAC. Approval of the package constituted authority to launch provided a 12 hour prior message of intent to CINCPAC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff was filed after the flight was cleared with AMEMB Saigon. Silence from higher authority signified approval for MACV to execute.

(2) Maritime Operations. The procedures were essentially the same as for air operations. COMUSMACV submitted a package of maritime missions for approval by CINCPAC and Washington for a 30-day period, or as directed. After the package was approved at the Washington level, COMUSMACV was cleared to launch the missions but was required to send a message of intent to JCS and CINCPAC 24 hours in advance. (The requirement for clearance by AMEMB Saigon was not spelled out for maritime missions). Silence from higher authority signified approval to launch.

(3) Psychological Operations. Psychological operations not conducted as part of air or maritime missions were submitted for each calendar month via CINCPAC to JCS for approval.

c. Discretionary Authority.

(1) Maritime Operations. The move toward delegating approval authority from the Washington level to CINCPAC commenced in the maritime operations. In January 1965, CINCPAC was authorized** to approve separate LOKI (junk capture) missions to meet intelligence requirements without Washington approval. In March 1965, CINCPAC was authorized*** to approve and execute the following missions:

* (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 212235Z Jan 65 (SACSA).
 ** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 131948Z Jan 65.
 *** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 251842Z Mar 65.

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(a) DRIFT. Distribution of gift kits and transistor radios ashore and off shore.

(b) CADO. Psychological deception operation executed by agents, infiltrated and exfiltrated by rubber boats/PTF transports, on isolated stretches of the NVN coast.

(c) SWALLOW. Coastal personnel captures. Raiding party from PTFs and SWIFTs capture NVN personnel in isolated areas for psychological/intelligence exploitation, similar to LOKI mission. Later CINCPAC designated the code word CADO to cover the three actions.

In June 1965, CINCPAC was authorized* to initiate PTF harassment/interdiction missions against Tiger Island at his discretion. In July, CINCPAC was authorized**, at his discretion, to permit PTFs returning from unsuccessful PSYOPS/INTELL maritime operations to place interdiction/harassment fires on certain coastal targets. Finally, in November, CINCPAC was authorized*** at his discretion to employ PTFs in shipping interdiction missions up to 20° north latitude and to deliver psychological leaflets by 81mm mortar rounds.

(2) Air Operations. Throughout the year 1965, there was a parallel move to decentralize control of air operations. In February 1966, authority**** was delegated to CINCPAC for executing OPLAN 34A air missions in the following words:

"You are authorized to approve for execution specific OPLAN 34A air missions in support of mission concepts and objectives that have been approved at the Washington level."****

Both operational and approval authority now rested with CINCPAC; however, the final political decision still rested in the American Ambassador, Saigon and the State Department in Washington. The requirement for approval of new concepts and/or mission objectives continued to rest with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and higher authority.

* (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 091719Z June 65.
 ** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 081458Z July 65.
 *** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 291649Z Nov 65.
 **** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 152235Z Feb 66 (SACSA).

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*** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 291649Z Nov 65.
 **** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 152235Z Feb 66 (SACSA).

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d. 1967 Consolidation. In March 1967, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed* the evolution of discretionary authority to CINCPAC and consolidated the procedures required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and higher authority governing the submission and approval of proposed FOOTBOY (C) operations.

(1) MAROPS and AIROPS. CINCPAC was authorized to approve for execution missions whose concepts and objectives had been approved at the Washington level. New concepts had to be coordinated with Embassies Bangkok, Saigon, and/or Vientiane, as appropriate, and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and higher authority. A 12-hour prior to launch intent message originated by MACV to CINCPAC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Silence from higher authority signified approval.

(2) TIMBERWORK/Airborne Procedures. CINCPAC was authorized to conduct TIMBERWORK (C) operations in support of concepts and objectives that had been approved at the Washington level. The requirement for approval to infiltrate new in-place agent teams into NVN continued to rest with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and higher authority.

(3) HUMIDOR (C)/PSYOPS. CINCPAC was authorized to conduct HUMIDOR (C) operations in support of mission concepts and objectives that had been approved at the Washington level.

e. STRATA Teams. The STRATA team authority message** issued by CINCPAC in April 1967, specifically spelled out that CINCPAC would approve or disapprove missions for execution and would provide COMUSMACV with infiltration, exfiltration, repositioning, resupply and reinforcement mission numbers. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCPAC were to be information addressees on coordination, intent, launch, recovery messages and incident reports.

* (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 101523Z Mar 67 (SACSA).

** (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 120052Z Apr 67 (SACSA).

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f. Summary. The following chart summarizes the procedures
in effect in 1967:

MACSOG OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY	APPROVING AUTHORITY			
	MACV	CINCPAC	JCS	SEC DEF with STATE Concurrence
Air ops within existing concepts				
Maritime ops within existing concepts				
STRATA Team infil, exfil, reinf, resup				
Long term agent team infil				
Long term agent team reinf, resup, exfil				
Psy ops within existing concepts				
New concepts for all types of ops				

g. Pre-Bombing Halt Procedures. The procedures that had
evolved by 1967 were continued up to the bombing halt of
November 1968. A summary of basic coordination and approval pro
cedures for the use of SACSA action officers was worded as
follows:

(1) Approval for individual operations within already
approved concepts has been delegated to CINCPAC. CINCPAC
has further delegated authority to MACV. MACV intent to
launch messages should reach both CINCPAC and JCS in time
for either of those agencies to disapprove the mission.
Silence indicates approval.

(2) Approval of an entirely new concept requires formal
JCS action - flimsy, buff, green, etc. In most cases, the
JCS action will include obtaining SECDEF and STATE approval.

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(3) Between the routine operation within approved concepts and the obtaining of approval for entirely new concepts, there is a "gray" area. This area involves those cases where a formal JCS action is not required, but SECDEF and/or State concurrence is needed. As a primary example, once military or political events have dictated an alteration of some type in a FOOTBOY(C) operation by high level authority, the normal channel for reopening the subject is via SACSA to the Chairman, JCS, to the SECDEF.

4. (TS) Current Program

a. Reorientation Plan. Incorporating many of the recommendations of the CINCPAC and AD HOC survey teams, MACV/SOG, in February 1968, submitted a proposal for reorientation of the FOOTBOY (C) program with emphasis on expanding the SSPL concept. The proposal retained the intelligence collection role as an adjunct to a central, integrated psychological effort to implant the leadership of North Vietnam the fear that by continued prosecution of the war, their control of an increasingly dissatisfied and disillusioned people would be diminished and possibly lost. Upon reaching SACSA, the proposal was routed to CIA for comment at the time the first bombing halt negotiations were nearing completion. CIA commented as follows:

(1) Non-concurrence with the proposal to establish an actual resistance group in NVN.

(2) In consideration of the negotiation effort, did not consider it the proper time to surface the proposals with higher authority.*

* (TS) Memo, SACSA Staff to General Depuy, "FOOTBOY (C) Operations (C)", 3 July 1968 (SACSA)

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On 9 May 1968, SACSA sent a revised copy of the proposals to
 CIA, agreeing with the two recommendations above * In view of
 the continued state of negotiations, the plan has not been con-
 sidered by the Interdepartmental Committee. However SCG has imple-
 mented certain of the proposals within the plan that were within
 previously approved guidelines

b. Standdown, 1 April 1968. The restrictions on bombing
 in NVN imposed by the President on 31 March 1968, set off a long
 series of messages ** in early April between CINCPAC and the Joint
 Chiefs of Staff establishing the new ground rules for FOOTBOY(C)
 operations. The resulting constraints are summarized below:

(1) PLOWMAN (C). No operations permitted above 20-00N, and
 those below limited to stop and search of NVN watercraft,
 interrogation, but not detention of NVN watercraft crews, and

* (TS) Memo, SACSA to CIA, "Proposed Reorientation of Covert
 Operations Against North Vietnam," 9 May 1968 (SACSA).
 ** (TS) See FOOTBOY(C) Authority File.

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missions necessary to return detainees. Detainees now at
 PARADISE(C) to be returned on a steady and progressive basis.
 No cross-beach (CADO) operations targeted against NVN.

(2) ~~MIDRIFF (C)~~. No operations permitted above 20-00N
 with following exceptions:

(a) Resupply of RED DRAGON and REMUS utilizing
 unmarked C-123 aircraft and black CHINAT crews was
 authorized.

(b) Exfiltration of four members of EASY from landing
 zone (LZ) in Laos utilizing USAF CH-3 helicopters was
 authorized. USAF CH-3 helicopters would not penetrate
 NVN north of 20-00N.

(3) ~~HUMIDOR (C)~~. Normal operations permitted subject
 to therapeutic guidance provided by Washington level and except
 as restricted by limitations placed on PLOWMAN (C) and
 MIDRIFF (C) operations. The winddrift of leaflets north
 of 20-00N from aircraft flying south of 20-00N was implicitly
 prohibited.

(4) Further restrictions on PLOWMAN (C) imposed by CINCPAC.
 Operations permitted only to 19-00N and specifically limited
 as follows:

(a) Firing or delivery of ordnance in the area from
 17-00N to 19-00N will be specifically limited to that
 required for self-defense.

(b) Operations between 17-00N and 19-00N will be
 limited to the stopping and searching of NVN watercraft,
 jettisoning/confiscation of military supplies discovered,
 the on-site interrogation of the NVN crews, and the return
 of detainees.

(c) No prisoners will be taken during the conduct of
 any PLOWMAN (C) operations north of 17-00N.

(d) No PLOWMAN (C) cross-beach operations will be
 conducted north of 17-00N.*

* (TS) Memo, SACSA, "FOOTBOY(C) Increased Actions (C)", 23 May 1968
 (SACSA).

conducted north of 17-00N.*

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c. Reaction to Standdown. The reaction from COMUSMACV to the restrictions was immediate and typical of the comments of others closely associated with the FOOTBOY (C) program.

"MACV recommends that there be no change in the FOOTBOY (C) operations because of the modified bombing program in RVN. MACV has placed increased emphasis on the notional SSPL organization and a lull or cessation of FOOTBOY (C) activities that corresponds to the modified bombing program would be a clear indication to Hanoi that the SSPL is a US controlled and directed organization."*

Several specific proposals were introduced in the months following 1 April with the intent of preserving some of the effectiveness of the program.

(1) Maritime Operations. On 1 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff altered the restrictions** in effect to permit PTF operations up to 20° latitude, including the stopping and searching of NVN watercraft and the interrogation of NVN watercraft crews as part of coastal surveillance. Additional clearance was given to detain not more than 10 crewmen per week for intelligence exploitation to be returned to NVN within two weeks. These latter operations were cleared up to 19°N latitude. Also, the conduct of cross-beach (CADO) operations against Tiger Island at CINCPAC discretion were authorized.

(2) Other Proposals. In August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the area of the maritime detention program be increased from 19°N latitude to 20°. In support of the proposal, CINCPAC had pointed out that the most lucrative area of coastline for maritime operations was between 18°-50'N to 20°-10'N. Because of the uncertainties of the program's direction at this time, it was not until 18 October that the plan was finally disapproved by Deputy Secretary Nitze.*** Proposals to resupply agent teams was held in abeyance until the MACV/CAS survey of agent team security was completed in July. The report of the survey,**** which established that all agent teams were probably compromised, led to the decision in November

to drop all

* (TS) Msg, USMACV, DTG 020914Z Apr 68 (SACSA)

** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 011351Z July 68 (SACSA)

*** (TS) Memo, SACSA, "FOOTBOY (C)", 24 Oct 68 (SACSA)

**** (TS) Ltr, MACSOG, "Security of Agent Teams (C)", 19 Jul 69

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in-place teams at the earliest feasible time. Clearance
 was granted* in the interim, however, to resupply team
 TOURBILLON (above 20°N) in conjunction with the resupply
 of two notional teams. On the eve of the complete bombing
 halt on 1 November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed
 CINCPAC/COMUSMACV** that the proposals for "Gray Singleton
 Concept" and "SSPL pseudo-cells in coastal hamlets"
 had been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff but was being
 held in abeyance by higher authority for an indefinite period.

d. Bombing Halt. On 1 November 1968, CINCPAC/COMUSMACV
 was directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff*** to discontinue all
 physical support of TIMBERWORK (C) teams, terminate STRATA
 operations, discontinue all PLOWMAN (C) missions north of 17-00N
 and discontinue all air operations over NVN and leaflet
 operations into NVN.

e. Summary of Current Operations. As a result of the
 restrictions imposed in April, and those associated with the
 later bombing halt of 1 November, MACSOG operations were severely
 curtailed in 1968 and into 1969. Following 1 November, radio
 broadcasts and letter delivery to NVN were continued; however,
 the delivery of leaflets, radios and gift kits was stopped.
 Maritime operations north of 17° were suspended after 1 November,
 however, assets were utilized for support of cross-beach, in-
 country operations. STRATA assets were prohibited from being
 used in NVN, but were utilized in Laos and Cambodia. The
 long-term agent teams were instructed to exfiltrate and were to
 be gradually phased out through surfacing by NVN security, perm-
 anently going off the air or by exfiltrating. MACSOG air operations
 were halted on 1 November, but assets were utilized in training
 or in support of other MACSOG programs.****

* (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 111529Z Sep 68 (SACSA).
 ** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 011927Z Nov 68 (SACSA).
 *** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 010219Z Nov 68 (SACSA).
 **** (TS) Command History, MACV 1968, "Year-end Review Vietnam,"
 7 Feb 1969. (SACSA)

*** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 010219Z Nov 68 (SACSA)

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f. General Constraints. In the preparation of the paper
 "FOOTBOY (C) - Revised Concept for Covert Actions Against
 North Vietnam (TS)"* mentioned earlier in this volume, SACSA
 summarized the limiting factors which had affected the
 FOOTBOY (C) program from its inception to that time.

"(1) Current US national policy is explicit in denying
 any intention on the part of the US to bring about the
 downfall of the Hanoi regime.

"(2) Both by definition as covert actions and by the
 terms of the original program approval, US involvement
 in FOOTBOY (C) must be plausibly deniable by the US
 Government.

"(3) Despite the basic rationale behind covert or black
 operations, i.e., to espouse causes which cannot be overtly
 supported by our national government for either political
 or military reasons; the notional resistance movement,
 the Sacred Sword Patriot's League (SSPL), has been
 precluded from advocating the overthrow of the present
 regime. Without such doctrinal support, the development
 among the North Vietnamese population of a base of support
 for spontaneous resistance and/or organized opposition
 is vitually precluded.

"(4) MACSOG troop carrier aircraft are prohibited from
 entering areas in NVN within effective range of enemy
 SAM sites. SAM coverage is extensive thus limiting the
 area in NVN available to troop carrier aircraft (C-123s
 and C-130s) engaged in initial entry of MACSOG agents,
 reinforcement of existing agent teams, resupply of
 programmed and previously activated target areas, and
 exfiltration as appropriate."*

* (TS) Paper, SACSA, "Proposed Reorientation of Covert Operations
 Against North Vietnam (TS)", 9 May 1968 (SACSA).

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~~TOP SECRET~~D. (TS) POST-HOSTILITIES PLANNING

In November 1968, CINCPAC called a one-day working level conference to review MACSOG programs, in light of the bombing halt, and to consider post-hostility proposals. The discussion and recommendations concerning the FOOTBOY(C) program are quoted below:

1. (TS) "Discussion: In accordance with existing U.S. national directives, control and direction of covert operations against NVN would revert to CAS. Termination of the military sponsored covert programs and/or turnover to CAS to be accomplished at a schedule to be determined.

2. (TS) "Recommendations:

a. "That SOG be reconfigured as a Joint Special Operations Advisory Detachment.

b. "That STD be reorganized and assigned a new role as the Special Operations Staff element of the JGS.

c. "That the RVNAF be advised and assisted in the development of a small but high quality Special Operations capability.

d. "That an appropriate number of PTFs be continued on loan to RVNAF.

e. "That selected VNAF air assets be earmarked for support of an improved GVN Special Operations capability.

f. "That indigenous ground force assets now under SOG control be disbanded and efforts directed toward the improvement of the LLOB (ARVN Special Forces) within the ARVN force structure.

g. "That provision be made for appropriate U.S. advisory detachments for GVN air, ground and naval Special Operations elements.

h. "That the Black PSYOPS assets be transferred to CAS.

i. "That, in the event the USG does not desire to retain the VOF assets, these be transferred to GVN."*

* (TS) Report, CINCPAC, "Conference on MACSOG Programs," 6 Nov 68 (SACSA).

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PART III. RESOURCES (U)

A. (TS) INTRODUCTION

The purpose of Part III is to provide the reader a brief summary, for continuity, of the organization and facilities utilized by SOG in conducting FOOTBOY(C). The supporting annexes include further detail on resources within each program in FOOTBOY(C).

B. (TS) ORGANIZATION

1. (TS) Initial Organization. In February 1964, MACV proposed an initial JTD of 167 personnel, 138 military and 29 civilians. JCS, on recommendation of CINCPAC, approved* a JTD of 128 personnel. At about the same time, CINCPAC authorized a TDY Army augmentation (Special Forces) of one officer and 15 enlisted to assist in the training at Camp Long Thanh. The Navy also provided seven officers and 52 enlisted TDY for maintenance, training and security of the US Naval Advisory Detachment (NAD), Danang.** The organization in January 1965 is shown in Figure C-1. Of particular note is the position of the senior CAS representative assigned as Deputy Commander, SOG. (This CAS position was later changed to Special Advisor to Chief, SOG and moved out of the direct chain of command.)

2. (TS) Evolution of Organization. With the addition of missions, SOG grew in numbers and underwent several organizational changes. By May 1966, four JTD changes had been approved, raising the total manpower level to 266 personnel. A later JTD of October 1967 raised the total to 416 authorized personnel. 155 officers, 251 enlisted and 10 civilians.*** The most recent

* (S) Message, JCS, DTG 141955 Jul 64.


** (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex A, 1964 MACV Command History," p. I-2 (SACSA).

*** (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex F, 1968 MACV Command History," p. F-1 (SACSA).

~~TOP SECRET~~~~p. F-1 (SACSA).~~

FIGURE C-1 (TS)

MACSOG ORGANIZATION OF JANUARY 1965 (U)



a/ Augmented by TDY/TDY MTR's as required.

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reorganization, effective 7 December 1968, was undertaken in an effort to more clearly define the line and staff function of SOG (see Figure C-2). Each of the four FOOTBOY(C) Programs had a "Studies Branch" which was a staff agency and a "Studies Group" which was an operations activity. Each of the two divisions (Branch and Group) in the organization was directly responsible to Chief, SOG.

C. (TS) FACILITIES

By 1966, the locations of SOG installations supporting FOOTBOY(C) was permanently established as listed below:*

(See Figure C-3 .)

SOG Headquarters - MACV II Compound, Saigon
 MAROPS Group, Danang
 AIROPS Group, Nha Trang
 Airborne Operations Training Camp, Long Thanh
 PSYOPS Group, 7 Long Thap Tu, Saigon
 Logistics Branch, Two Houses in Saigon

Figures C-4 and C-5 show the resources available to SOG in August 1964 and at the time of the bombing halt in November 1968.

D. (TS) TRAINING

Detailed information on training for each of the FOOTBOY(C) Programs is covered in the annexes of this appendix. A brief summary follows.

1. (TS) Psychological Operations. Training of the Vietnamese in Black and White (VOF) radio operations was moderately successful in the case of the former and very successful in the case of the latter. Finding Vietnamese with the background and capability to be taught was a problem throughout. Hundreds of applicants were frequently interviewed in order to find one person to place in training as an announcer, for example. The excellent staff developed by VOF can be attributed to the fine caliber of personnel recruited by the senior Vietnamese supervisor. Another problem area was the language barrier between the US advisors and their counterparts. The very limited number of US advisors who could speak or understand Vietnamese greatly complicated efforts to train and supervise the Vietnamese.


* (TS) Report, Colonel Blackburn, "Debriefing," 21 May 1966, p. 5 (SACSA)

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Colonel Blackburn "Debriefing," 21 May 1966, Appendix C

FIGURE C-2 (TS)

MACSOG ORGANIZATION OF DECEMBER 1968 (TS)



a/ (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex F, 1968 MACV Command History," p. F-B-1

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
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FIGURE C-3 (2S)

SOG, FOOTBOY(C) INSTALLATIONS, 1966 (C)

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FIGURE C-1 (TS)

OPLAN 34A - RESOURCES STATUS (U)
6 August 1964PTF STATUS:

PTFs 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 - Operationally ready (All five participated in action on 30 July and 3 August)

PTF 4 - Training proceeding satisfactorily

PTFs 7 and 8 - Crews due to report 1 July. Expect to be operationally ready about 1 Oct 64.

SWIFT CRAFT STATUS:

All three SWIFTs operationally ready.

C-123 STATUS:

Two C-123 aircraft and crews operationally ready and available.

Program Status:

Five aircraft at Clark Air Base, Philippines. One in SVN for test of doppler navigation equipment.

Estimated 30 days in country training before reaching operational readiness.

Seven CHINAT and three VNAF aircrews completed training at Eglin Air Force Base.

(All CHINAT and VNAF electronic countermeasures operators have completed training and returned to home country awaiting deployment of aircraft to Vietnam).

PSYOPS TEAMS STATUS:

Teams in Place	- 13
Training	- 6 Ops teams and agent pool continue training
Readiness	- 6 teams operationally ready
	- 5 teams 95 percent ready
	- Agent pool 65 percent ready
	- 4 teams in holding area

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FIGURE C-5 (25)

SOG AVAILABLE RESOURCES - NOVEMBER 1968 (U)

NAFITTLE OPERATIONS

Patrol Boat, Fast (PTF)	- 11 (PTFs 3, 5-7, 10-12, 23-26) ^{a/}
SWIFTS	- 3 (SWIFTS 1-3)
PTF Crews, VN	- 11 (Crews 1-11)
SWIFT Crews, VN	- 3 (Crews 1-3)
Amphibious Landing Teams	- 4 (Total Strength 78)

AIR OPERATIONS

C-130E Aircraft (USAF)	- 4 (Assigned to 7th AF - priority to FOOTBOY(C))
C-123 Aircraft (HEAVY HOOK)	- 2
C-123 Aircraft (HEAVY MON)	- 2
ALC Aircraft (VNAF)	- 6
H-34 Helicopters (VNAF)	- As required for operations
Ch-3 Helicopters (USAF)	- As required for operations
F4C Aircraft (USAF)	- As required for operations
C-47 Aircraft (VNAF)	- As required for operations
CHINAT C-123 Aircrews	- 6
VNAF C-123 Aircrews	- 4 (back-up only)
USAF C-123 Aircrews	- 2
USAF C-130 Aircrews	- 5

AGILE SEAL OPERATIONS

In-Place Teams	- 05 (Total Strength 25)
Teams Available for Infiltration	- 1 (Total Strength 4)
Reinforcements Ready for Infiltration	- 0
SIRATA Teams Operationally Ready	- 6 (Total Strength 55)
Additional Personnel in Training	- 81 Personnel

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

20 KW Transmitter (Short Wave)	- 3
20 KW Transmitter (Medium Wave)	- 1
750 Watt Transmitter (Short Wave)	- 1
Miscellaneous Reproduction Equipment	

a/ SIX: PTFs lost on operations: (PTFs 14 and 15 grounded on reef; PTF 4 grounded on coast RVN; PTF 9 sunk by enemy air; PTF 8 sunk by friendly PTF by mistake; PTF 16 sunk in collision with PTF-6). Two PTFs withdrawn from Program for FET (PTFs 1 and 2)

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2. (TS) Agent Operations. Camp Long Thanh was the center for agent team training from the inception of the program. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Starting in late 1968, the camp was made the training center for SOG and courses were set up to train cross-border personnel who had previously been trained at the command and control centers. The two principal proper areas in the operation of CLT were recruiting quality personnel for training and maintaining a high standard of security on the mission of the camp and its trained teams.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

3. (TS) Air Operations. The training of third country (Chinese) crews for the C-123 program caused some problems early in the program. The training of Vietnamese pilots for the C-123 was not a success and was given up in 1966. The training of US crews for the C-130 aircraft caused no unusual problems.

4. (TS) Maritime Operations. Training was conducted in Danang by the US Mobile Support Team for the Vietnamese PTF crews in the areas of maintenance and operational training. The TDY SEAL Detachment was responsible for training the cross-beach teams in the skills necessary for their mission. In 1967, additional maintenance training for Vietnamese personnel was set up at Subic Bay, Philippines.

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PART IV. OPERATIONS SUMMARY (U)

A. (TS) INTRODUCTION

Part IV, Operations Summary, gives a broad overview of 34A operations from 1964 through 1968. A brief narrative of salient activities in each program for the year is followed by a summary chart of statistical data.

B. (TS) PHASE I AND II

The targets that were authorized for Phase I and II actions were approved at the highest level of government. The procedures in effect during the planning cycle have been discussed earlier in this appendix. As noted earlier, there was considerable emphasis on physical destruction operations in Phase I and II in contrast to the later change in emphasis to intelligence and, finally, psychological operations. The comments of Admiral Felt, CINCPAC, during the planning for Phase II showed prophetic insight into the future direction of OP 34A operations:

"Air strikes and aerial mining are the only physical destruction operations within the current GVN capability that provide sufficient impact to cause DRV to reevaluate their RVN and Laos activities. ... I recommend that Phase II operations concentrate on intelligence collection, propaganda type psychological operations, the development of resistance movement cadre and intelligence nets, physical destruction by air attack and aerial mine laying."*

Figure C-6 is a list of the 55 approved Phase I and II actions.

Figure C-7 shows the locations of the five successful physical destruction operations conducted from January-July 1964. A description of three of these actions, all maritime, follows:

a. Action 45A - Hai Khau Storage Area. On night of 12-13 June, a 26-man raiding team landed from PTF 5, fired 75mm recoilless rifles and machine guns at storage and barracks buildings for a period of ten minutes. Several buildings are believed to have been damaged. No resistance was encountered and no casualties were sustained.

* (TS) Ltr, CINCPAC to JCS, "Operational Planning, Vietnam (U)," 18 April 1964 (SACSA).

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18 April 1964 (SACSA).

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FIGURE C-6 (15)

OPLAN 344 - PHASE I AND II
APPROVED ACTIONS (U)

Action Number	
	<u>INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION:</u>
1	Aerial Photography of Target Areas to be Accomplished 30 Days Prior to Individual Operation.
2	Beach Reconnaissance in Vicinity of Selected Targets
3	COMINT/ELINT
4	Tactical Reconnaissance of Selected Target Areas
	<u>PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIONS</u>
5	Strategic Leaflets by Air (See Glossary)
6	Strategic Leaflets Maritime Delivery
7	Tactical Leaflets by Air (See Glossary)
8	Tactical Leaflets Maritime Delivery
9	Utility Kit Delivery
10	Deception Media Simulating Resistance Movements Operations
11	Phantom Resupply Delivery (Deception)
12	Phantom Team or Agent Delivery (Deception)
13	Black Propaganda Operations by Mail
18	Black Radio Number 1 operations - Commenced broadcasting in first phase of plan implementation. Red Flag operations.
19	Black Radio Number 2 operations scheduled to commence broadcasting during Phase II of plan implementation. Sacred Sword operations.

a/ (TS) Report, SACSA, "Red Book," 7 July 1964.

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FIGURE C-6 (25) (CONT'D)

Action Number	
	<u>PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIONS:</u> (Continued)
20	White Radio (Voice of Free Vietnam) operations commenced broadcasting six hours per day to be gradually increased to 12 hours per day.
21	Action team delivery by air.
22	Deception drops in support of team operations.
23	Develop Meo guerrilla operations program.
24	Develop non-Meo tribal area (Thai, Nung, Tho, Kha) resistance. Operations #1 to be launched in 7th month of plan implementation.
25	Develop non-Meo tribal area (Thai, Nung, Tho, Kha) resistance. Operation #2 to be launched in 10th month of plan implementation.
26	Catholic Resistance Movements.
27	Other Societal Resistance Groups.
28	Selective Political Pressures to Impress Certain Information on DRV Authorities.
	<u>PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION:</u>
29	Interdiction Route 7 by airborne Special Forces
30	Interdiction Route 8 by airborne Special Forces
31	Interdiction Route 12 by airborne Special Forces
32	SEAL Team strike on Vinh Son
33	SEAL Team strike on dredges and buoy tender in Haiphong Channel
35	SEAL Team strike on Ben Thuy

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~~TOP SECRET~~~~FIGURE C-6 (2L) (CONT'D)~~

ACTION Number	
37	SEAL Team strike on Dong Hoi airfield
41	UDT raid by four-man team on SWATCHes
42	Raid on security post and four coastal defense guns
43	Sabotage Ly Hoa Bridge
44	Sabotage Route 1 Bridges
45	Sneak Attack on Security Post at Mouth of Dong Hoi River
46	Sabotage Two Small Bridges on Route 1
47	Amphibious Infiltration and Road Mining
48	UDT Sneak Attack on Ron Ferry
54	Airdrop Ten-Man Long-Term Team for Hit-and-Run Attack on Leng Son-Hanoi Railway. Team to Remain in area for long-term operation.
55	Airdrop long-term five-man team to operate against Yen Bay-Lao Kay Railway northwest of Yen Bay.


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FIGURE C-7 (TS)



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b. Action 44C - Bridge, Route 1. On night of 26-27 June, a Route 1 bridge was attacked by a demolition team of seven men accompanied by a 24-man marine covering force landed from PTF 6. The bridge was destroyed and two bridge guards killed. Four other DRV personnel were killed by the raiders on their return trip to the boats. No casualties were sustained by the raiders.

c. Action 37A - Dong Hai Reservoir Pump House. On night of 30 June-1 July, a 23-man team landed from PTF 5 under fire and assisted by covering fire from PTF 5. (PTF 6 stood by as escort and alternate.) Eighteen rounds of 57mm ammunition was expended against the pump house and the pump house is believed to have been destroyed. DRV casualties are unknown. RVN losses were one wounded and two missing in action, three 57mm recoilless rifles (two spiked before abandonment).*

c. (TS) OVERALL 1964 OPERATIONS

1. (TS) Airborne Operations. Of the six teams infiltrated by blimp drop, five were captured almost immediately. At year's end, six viable teams [REDACTED] were in-place in NVN) with a total strength of 62 agents.

2. (TS) Maritime Operations. MAROPS Group acquired a total of eight PTF (including six NASTY class) and three SWIFT boats. Ninety-two primary missions were conducted with no boat losses and 10 personnel lost.

3. (TS) Psychological Operations. Three radio programs were established in 1964 and by April 1965 were broadcasting as follows: Radio Red Flag (black) - one hour daily; Voice of the SSPL (black) - 1½ hours daily; Voice of Freedom (white) - 8½ hours daily. Over 41 million leaflets and 20,000 gift kits were delivered to NVN. [REDACTED]

4. (TS) Air Operations. Six modified C-123 aircraft were assigned to SOG, but two were lost and replaced by unmodified planes. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] About 60 percent of the missions scheduled in support of 34A were successful.**

* (TS) Memo, SACSA, "34A Operations-Physical Destruction," 1 July 1964 (SACSA).

** (TS) Report, Col Blackburn, "Debriefing," 21 May 1966 (SACSA).

[REDACTED] of the missions scheduled in support of 34A were successful.**

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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5. (TS) Figure C-2 is a summary of 34A actions in 1964. 1

D. (TS) 1965 OPERATIONS 2

1. (TS) Airborne Operations 3

a. Execution of small demolitions, disruption of lines of
communication (LOC), and limited psychological warfare opera- 4
tions continued to be performed by indigenous personnel of 5
varying ethnic origins. With the advent of US bombing of 6
North Vietnam, the emphasis shifted to gathering of intelligence 7
and establishing contacts with the local population to broaden 8
the intelligence base for possible future exploitation. 9

b. During the year, in-place teams were reinforced and two 10
new teams were infiltrated. Nine teams with a total of 83 11
were in place at the end of the year. 12

2. (TS) Maritime Operations 13

a. Covert boat and landing team operations were conducted 14
against the coast of North Vietnam to interdict small coastal 15
shipping, capture prisoners for interrogations and psychological 16
warfare exploitation, and to force North Vietnam to increase 17
its coastal defenses. 18

(1) Six NASTY Class PTFs (Patrol Torpedo Boats, Fast) 19
and three SWIFT boats were available at US Naval Advisory 20
Detachment (USNAD) at the beginning of the year. Four more 21
PTFs were assigned during the year to make a total of 10. 22
However, six PTFs and two SWIFTS were normally all that were 23
available for operations at any one time. This was due to the 24
necessity for overhaul or repair which resulted from the 25
expanded tempo and scope of operations. 26

(2) An average of 148 Vietnamese military or civilian, 27
and Chinese civilian landing team personnel were operationally 28
ready and in a constant state of training throughout the year. 29

b. One hundred and fifty-five missions were conducted 30
during 1965. One man was killed in action, 18 were wounded in 31
action, and one PTF was lost. 32

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OPERATION PLAN 34A ACTIONS ATTEM TFD AND ACCOMPLISHED - 1964 ()

AIRTEL OPERATIONS (by mission)	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
<u>Infiltration (Physical Destruction)</u>	-	-	-	-	-	3	(1)	-	-	-	-	-	3
Junk Captures (JOKI)	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	-	1	-	-	4
Reconnaissance	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Bombardments	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	-	2	2	1	8
<u>AIR OPERATIONS (by missions)</u>													
Leaflet/Utility Kite	-	-	1	3	4	-	1	-	-	-	1	2	11
Interment/Deception	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
New Team Infiltrated	-	-	-	1	1	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	6
In-Place Teams Reinforced/Resupplied	-	-	-	1	1	-	2	-	-	1	1	-	6
In-Place Teams Resupplied	-	1	2	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	2	6
<u>PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS</u>													
White Radio (WOP) Hours	-	-	-	30	180	180	201	201	246	283	255	283	1,119
Black Radio (A-Ted Flag) Hours	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31	24	31	30	31	141
Black Radio (B-C-S-P) Hours	-	-	40	40	19	-	-	124	207	265	55	410	1,119
Black Propaganda Mail - Letters	-	-	1.5	3.66	4.47	1.24	5.53	.01	-	03	4.22	14.9	41.0
Leaflets - Millions	-	5.5	-	2,400	6,610	450	8,400	1,100	-	-	-	1,120	20,170
Gift Kite	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<u>UNRECORDED OPERATIONS</u>													
Leaflet/Utility Kite	-	1	12	30	31	23	24	30	11	12	13	-	157

NOTE: Figures in parentheses indicate unpaired t -test.

1. (a) Personnel: 1. Mr. A. Ned Bock, 1 February 1966 (SACSA).

Figure 1

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3. (TS) Psychological Operations. Psychological operations consisted of operation of both black and white radio stations, leaflet drops, distribution of radios and gift kits by sea and air, black letter operations and interrogation and indoctrination of prisoners taken as a result of maritime operations.

4. (TS) Air Operations

a. Covert reinforcement and resupply of in-place teams were conducted by fixed wing C-123 aircraft during the year. A total of 22 successful missions were flown.

b. In support of the PSYOPS missions, air operations flew a total of 30 successful covert PSYOPS missions dispensing more than 60 million leaflets and gift kits during the year.

c. The VNAF H-34 helicopters were used to infiltrate and exfiltrate SHINING BRASS teams into Laos and infiltrate team ROMEO into NVN.

d. The increased logistical support for SOG units resulted in an increase of tonnage and flying hours for the C-123s. The C-123s flew a total of 3,647 hours, and airlifted 328 tons of equipment.*

5. (TS) Figure C-9 is a summary of 34A actions in 1965.

E. (TS) 1966 OPERATIONS

1. (TS) Airborne Operations

a. The Airborne Operations Section, in conjunction with Strategic Technical Service (STS) counterpart personnel, continued to recruit, train, equip, and infiltrate agent teams into NVN, and subsequently to resupply and reinforce these teams. The team missions were to collect intelligence, conduct sabotage and psychological operations, and render assistance to downed aircrews.

* (TS) History, MACSCG, "Annex N 1965 MACV Command History," p.2 (SACSA).

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FIGURE C-1 (76)

OPERATION PLAN 34A ACTIONS ATTEMPTED AND ACCOMPLISHED - 1965

NAVY/NAVY OPERATIONS (by mission)	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
<u>Bombardment</u>	9 (2)	2 (3)	3 (2)	4 (-)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18 (7)
<u>Deception (CAD)</u>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<u>Junk Captures (LORD)</u>	-	1 (1)	1 (1)	1 (2)	6 (-)	-	4 (4)	4 (-)	1 (2)	1 (1)	-	-	18 (15)
<u>PSYOPS Leaflets/Kits (PSYOPS)</u>	1 (-)	2 (-)	2 (2)	2 (-)	12 (2)	26 (-)	3 (1)	4 (-)	3 (-)	1 (-)	-	-	54 (5)
<u>Kidnap Airborne (WALLON)</u>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 (5)	1 (1)	2 (2)	-	-	2 (9)
<u>Shipping Interdiction (WINT)</u>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 (1)	2 (6)	2 (4)	5 (11)
<u>Shipping Interdiction/STOPS (HUNT/STOPS)</u>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4 (-)	4 (-)
<u>AIR OPERATIONS (by mission)</u>													
<u>Leaflet/Utility Kits</u>	4 (-)	-	1 (-)	-	2 (-)	-	6 (1)	3 (2)	4 (1)	4 (1)	3 (2)	2 (1)	29 (11)
<u>Interment/Deception</u>	-	2 (-)	-	4 (-)	1 (-)	-	-	1 (1)	-	-	-	-	8 (1)
<u>PSYOPS Teams Infiltrated</u>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 (-)	-	1
<u>PSYOPS Teams Re-Informed/Resupplied</u>	1 (-)	2 (-)	-	3 (-)	2 (3)	-	1 (1)	3 (6)	4 (1)	3 (3)	4 (1)	-	21 (11)
<u>PSYOPS Teams Destructive Actions</u>	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
<u>COMMUNICATION OPERATIONS</u>													
<u>White Radio - Heavy</u>	263	238	263	255	263	255	263	263	255	263	255	263	3,102
<u>Black Radio A - Heavy</u>	31	28	31	30	31	30	31	31	30	31	30	31	365
<u>Black Radio B - Heavy</u>	229	150	265	254	12	416	458	469	414	470	490	561	4,148
<u>Black Radio C - Heavy</u>	576	11	35	43	49	.01	17.7	12.5	8.7	7.1	7.2	2.6	70.5
<u>Leaflets - Millions</u>	5,360	4,207	-	600	3,296	1,236	608	4,670	2,792	259	308	1,856	25,702
<u>Gifts - Millions</u>	19	34	26	40	25	16	18	20	14	24	17	13	204

of 111 - 16 - 1965 (by mission) Total the number of attempts

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b. At the beginning of the year, there were nine in-place teams, representing a total of 78 agents. During the year, three new teams were infiltrated. Teams were resupplied 28 times. One team and two sub-teams, a total of 22 men, were lost during the year. In addition, 11 agents were killed in action, three died of wounds, and six died of other causes. The year ended with 11 in-place teams, a total of 79 agents.

2. (TS) Maritime Operations

a. Covert boat and landing team operations continued to be conducted against coastal shipping and the coast of NVN, with the objectives of interdicting coastwise shipping, capturing prisoners for intelligence and psychological warfare exploitation, forcing North Vietnam to continue and increase diversion of their assets to coastal defense, and impairing or disrupting a portion of the NVN economy by hampering normal operations of the fishing fleet.

b. Nine NASTY Class PTFs and three SWIFT boats were in the inventory at the beginning of the year. Three new NASTY Class PTFs were acquired during the year. At the end of the year, seven NASTY Class PTFs and three SWIFT boats remained in the inventory. On the average, seven NASTY Class PTFs and three SWIFTS were operationally ready throughout the year, the remainder being down for overhaul or repair.

c. An average of 11 PTF crews were operationally ready throughout the year. Three SWIFT crews were continually operational. Action team strength at the beginning of the year was 134, organized in five teams. At the end of the year, this strength had decreased to 104, organized in four teams.

d. A total of 126 primary and 56 secondary missions were conducted during 1966. Eight men were killed in action, 15 were wounded in action, six were missing in action and five PTFs were lost.

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~~TOP SECRET~~3. (TS) Psychological Operations

a. Psychological operations continued with the same type of operations as in CY 1965. However, new facilities were provided, and all programs increased in scope, intensity, and quality. These programs are black and white radio broadcasts, leaflet drops over NVN, distribution of radios and gift kits by sea and air, black letter operations, and interrogation of prisoners taken as a result of maritime operations.

b. A significant addition to VOF was the initiation of Cantonese language broadcasts in November.*

4. (TS) Air Operations

a. Air operations in support of OPLAN 34A consisted of two types of missions: support of 34A agent teams and PSYOP leaflet, radio and gift kit drops. One hundred and ten missions were completed during the year, employing assets from USAF, VNAF and SOG 1st Flight Detachment. C-123, C-130, A-1, F-4C, and CH-3C aircraft were used for these missions.

b. Air Operations Logistics Section fraggged 442 missions in support of SOG activities. A total of 4,891,228 pounds of cargo and 13,893 passengers were airlifted, a considerable increase over CY 65. SOG C-123 and C-130E aircraft were used, [REDACTED]

5. (TS) Figure C-10 is a summary of 34A actions in 1966.

* (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex M 1966 MACV Command History," p. 3-4 (SACSA).

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~~TOP SECRET~~~~F. (TS) 1967 OPERATIONS~~~~1. (TS) Airborne Operations - TIMBERWORK (C)~~

a. The Airborne Operations Section, in conjunction with their Strategic Technical Directorate (STD) counterpart personnel, continued to recruit, train, equip and infiltrate agent teams into NVN, and subsequently to resupply and reinforce these teams. The team missions were to collect intelligence, conduct sabotage and psychological operations, and render assistance to downed aircrews.

b. OP-34 opened 1967 with eleven in-place teams or a total of 76 agents. During the year, four new teams, two singleton agents and two STRATA teams were infiltrated. Four teams were lost, seven agents killed in action, one died of wounds, five died of non-hostile injuries and three died of disease. Operational teams were resupplied 28 times during the year. The year ended with 11 in-place teams and two singleton agents for a total of 71 agents.

c. Significant accomplishments in the TIMBERWORK (C) area included the infiltration of the STRATA teams, the use of FLOWMAN (C) detainees infiltrated as normal returnees with a low level intelligence mission, and the first successful exfiltration of an agent team from North Vietnam. Additionally, diversionary operations were begun late in the year with the objective of diverting enemy resources to internal security roles. This was to be accomplished by the establishment of notional teams which would be resupplied and broadcast to in concert with false information broadcast to in-place teams considered to be under NVN control.

~~2. (TS) Maritime Operations - FLOWMAN (C)~~

a. One hundred and twenty-five FLOWMAN (C) missions were launched in 1967 against the shores of North Vietnam for the purposes of maritime interdiction, prisoner capture and general disruption of NVN coastal areas. Maritime interdiction continued to be most profitable in terms of enemy craft sunk and numbers of prisoners captured as well as intelligence collection.

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~~to be most profitable in terms of enemy craft sunk and numbers of~~

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b. Despite the added year of extensive operations, the hardening of NVN coastal defense sites and no respite from adverse weather, seven NASTY Class PTFs and three SWIFT boats remained in the SOG inventory throughout the year.

c. With continuous on-the-job training for boat crews and increased proficiency in boat handling, the utilization of PTFs improved to the extent that even with less boats in the inventory, more missions were completed than in years past. The casualty rate also declined appreciably: one VN KIA, three VN WIA and one VN MIA.

3. (TS) Psychological Operations - HUMIDOR (C)

a. Psychological operations continued with the same type of operations as in 1966. However, all programs increased in scope, intensity and quality. The SSPL received primary emphasis during 1967 in an attempt to establish it as a significant threat to Hanoi.

b. Leaflet, gift kit and radio drops continued and increased. Third country letter production and broadcasts increased as much as 50 percent. Project JENNY added significant impetus when BLUE EAGLE I commenced broadcasting over the Gulf of Tonkin on 1 June. Construction also was begun on a 200 KW transmitter site at Hue.

4. (TS) Air Operations - MIDRIFF (C)

a. Air operations in support of the FOOTBOY (C) program consisted of two types of missions: support of agent teams and PSYOP leaflet, radio and gift kit drops. During the year, 582 MIDRIFF (C) missions were scheduled and 294 completed utilizing USAF, VNAF and SOG aircraft.

b. Both the number of missions scheduled by the Air Operations Logistics Section and the amount of cargo airlifted doubled the previous year's figures. Over 860 missions were fraggd and over 10 million pounds of cargo airlifted by SOG C-123 and C-130 [REDACTED] aircraft.*

* (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex G to 1967 MACV Command History," p. G 2-3 (SACSA).

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5. (TS) Figure C-11 is a summary of 34A actions in 1967. 1

G. (TS) 1968 OPERATIONS 2

1. (TS) Airborne Operations - TIMBERWORK (C) 3

a. The Airborne Operations Section (redesignated as the 4
Airborne Studies Group in December) continued to administer 5
the TIMBERWORK (C), agent operations, portion of the FOOTBOY (C) 6
program during 1968 in conjunction with its STD counterpart 7
personnel. Major significant changes in the TIMBERWORK (C) program 8
in 1968 were caused by the April restriction on air operations 9
north of 20°N, by a security assessment in June which evaluated 10
all the then in-place teams as probably under NVN control, and 11
by the 1 November 1968 halt of air activities north of 17°N. 12
TIMBERWORK (C) operations in 1968 were conducted under three 13
subordinate programs: Agent Operations, STRATA, and Diversionary 14
Operations (FORAE)(C)). 15

b. Agent operations opened 1968 with eight in-place teams 16
operational in NVN. Two teams (EASY and REMUS) were surfaced by 17
NVN and one team (ROMEO) was declared MIA during the year. 18
As a result of the June security assessment, the remaining five 19
teams were being utilized in a diversionary capacity at year's end 20
with plans for termination in the near future. Recruiting and 21
training of singleton agents continued. 22

c. STRATA operations in 1968 were characterized by a refinement 23
of insertion, extraction and communications techniques. From 24
March until 1 November, 24 STRATA teams were inserted into NVN. 25
One team (120) was lost in its entirety and portions of three 26
others were declared MIA for a total of 15 agents lost. The 27
STRATA Forward Operating Base (FOB) and operational assets were 28
transferred to the operational control of OP-35 in November, 29
and ended the year being effectively employed in the PRAIRIE FIRE/ 30
DANIEL BOONE areas of Laos and Cambodia. 31

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FIGURE C-11 (TS)
FOOTNOT (C) ACTIONS ATTEMPTED AND ACCOMPLISHED - 1967 ()

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
<u>MARITIME OPERATIONS (by missions)</u>													
Shipping Interdiction/STOPS (MINT/PSHEAR)	1 (2)	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5 (2)
Shipping Interdiction (only) (MINT)	3 (5)	2 (5)	7 (8)	7 (6)	7 (5)	6 (5)	8 (6)	5 (6)	6 (4)	4 (5)	4 (4)	3 (4)	62 (63)
Shipping Interdiction (LOKI)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 (1)	-	-	1 (5)
Team Landing Ops-Ambush/Kidnap Ashore (CAIO)	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 (1)	0 (2)	0 (2)	1 (1)	0 (2)	0 (1)	2 (12)
Special Reconnaissance	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 (-)
<u>AIR OPERATIONS (by mission)</u>													
Leaflet/Gift Kite	12 (1)	11 (1)	8 (1)	12	10	3	7 (2)	10 (3)	10 (3)	8 (2)	10 (0)	9 (4)	110 (17)
Radio Rebroadcast	-	-	-	-	1	26	23 (0)	22 (0)	26 (0)	14 (2)	23 (1)	10 (1)	115 (4)
New Team Infiltration	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	2 (1)	0 (2)	-	-	4 (3)
Agent Team Reinforcement	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 (0)	-	-	-	-	1 (0)
Agent Team Resupply	5 (17)	1 (2)	5 (7)	2 (1)	2 (1)	-	0 (2)	2 (0)	2 (5)	4 (8)	5 (10)	1 (2)	29 (55)
Agent Team Exfiltration	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 (0)	0 (3)	0 (3)	-	1 (9)
Special Reconnaissance	1	2 (1)	1	1	2 (2)	2 (1)	-	-	-	1 (4)	1 (7)	0 (2)	11 (17)
<u>PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS</u>													
Grey Radio - Hours	837	868	844	795	760	759	760	780	810	837	978	1,023	10,051
Black Radio (A-MED FLAG)-Hours	62	61	93	90	93	86	62	78	120	124	120	124	1,113
Black Radio (B-SEV)-Hours	124	122	310	300	310	300	372	372	360	372	360	403	3,705
Black Propaganda Mail - Ltrs	604	580	579	592	580	725	581	580	597	596	593	726	7,133
Leaflets - Millions	27.3	32.4	28.1	38.8	11.9	6.3	15.2	36.0	10.3	6.8	20.0	30.0	295.1
Girl Kite	6,046	4,438	1,834	1,740	3,700	700	2,240	600	2,150	0	0	0	24,048
Girl Radio	110	130	0	260	1,150	0	400	100	1,000	2,000	3,000	4,000	12,150

a/ Figures in parenthesis indicate unsuccessful attempts in addition to the successful missions

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d. Diversionary (FORAE(C)) operations were greatly expanded 1
 in 1968 with development of three sub-programs. OODLES(C), 2
 URGENCY(C) and BORDEN(C). Project OODLES(C) was designed to 3
 portray an apparently extensive and successful clandestine 4
 agent network in NVN. URGENCY(C) involved the use of 5
 fishermen detained during PLOWMAN(C) operations as pseudo- 6
 or, where possible, actual agents. Project BORDEN(C) employed 7
 NVA Chieu Hoi ralliers and volunteer prisoners-of-war to convince 8
 NVN that a successful penetration of the NVA was being conducted 9
 with the mission of inducing defection and collecting intelli- 10
 gence. Feedback during the year proved the success of the 11
 diversionary effort and, at year's end, the program remained 12
 oriented toward the diversion of NVN/NVA security forces and 13
 resources toward a non-existent infiltration of NVA/NVA organiza- 14
 tions and units. The effort of the diversionary program was 15
 changed after 1 November. Traffic with activated notional teams 16
 in NVN was restricted to messages sent by HUMIDOR(C) SSPL 17
 one-way voice link in the OODLES(C) project. Project URGENCY(C) 18
 ceased with the bombing halt. BORDEN(C) has been redirected to 19
 the VC/NVA-controlled areas of RVN, Laos and Cambodia. (Three - 20
 other phases of the divisionary program are discussed under 21
 psychological operations.) 22

2. (TS) Maritime Operations - PLOWMAN (C) 23

a. One hundred and forty PLOWMAN(C) missions were completed 24
 in 1968 targeted against NVN for the purposes of maritime 25
 interdiction, prisoner capture and general disruption of NVN 26
 coastal areas. MINT (Maritime Interdiction) missions continued 27
 to be the most profitable in terms of enemy craft sunk and numbers 28
 of detainees taken as well as intelligence collected. 29

b. During the year, PTF boat assets were increased to 11, 30
 enabling maritime operations to be increased to a round-the-clock 31
 capability. Seven days a week operations were the goal for 1968 32
 and in August, when the weather was most favorable, this goal 33
 was attained. 34

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and in August, when the weather was most favorable, this goal 35

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c. Six special missions were conducted by cross-beach action teams during CY 68. Restrictions imposed by higher authority limited employment of action teams and reduced a possible threat to the NVN mainland. On 1 November, all PLOWMAN(C) operations ceased due to presidential decision.

3. (TS) ~~Psychological Operations - HUMIDOR(C)~~

a. PSYOPS activities during 1968 included leaflet dispensing, fishermen detention and interrogation, black letter operations and black radio broadcasts. A major campaign was mounted at the start of CY 68 which aimed at increasing the credibility and pervasiveness of the SSPL. This campaign was later reduced in scope after 31 March, and was reduced still further after the 1 November bombing halt. Only radio operations, black letter operations and radio support of FORAE(C) diversionary operations to distract NVN resources and internal security away from actual clandestine operations, continued.

b. The results of covert PSYOPS against NVN during CY 68 may be measured by 18 different known articles and broadcasts of major proportion by official NVN media. NVN's attack on US/GVN covert PSYOPS included publication of a new and more severe law against counterrevolutionaries and suicide attacks directed against maritime forces participating in the HUMIDOR(C) program. Hanoi initiated a major effort via Hanoi radio and the Paris Peace Conference that was specifically designed to force the United States to cease all FOOTBOY(C) activities.

4. (TS) ~~Air Operations - MIDRIFF(C)~~. MIDRIFF(C) operations are air missions over and into NVN in support of other MACSOG FOOTBOY(C) operations. The following statistics are intended only to present an overview of the many MIDRIFF(C) missions and to indicate the scope of MACSOG Combat Air Operations in NVN.

<u>Type Mission</u>	<u>Scheduled</u>	<u>Completed</u>	
Resupply	120	16	31
PSYOPS	80	46	32
Visual Reconnaissance	10	6	33
STRATA	131	51	34
JENNY	365	308	35

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STRATA

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The relatively low percentage of completions in three of the categories can be attributed primarily to bad weather. Inability to make contact with an in-place team and aircraft maintenance also contributed to incomplete missions.*

5. (TS) Figures C-12 and C-13 summarize 1968 - June 1969 actions.

H. (TS) OTHER SUMMARIES

Figure C-14 is a statistical summary of the agent team program through December 1968. Figure C-15 shows the location of the three remaining teams as of July 1969. Figure C-16 shows the location of captured and missing agent teams and the dates they were lost.

I. (TS) MARITIME BOUNDARIES

Figure C-17 delineates the geographic boundaries of the maritime areas of operation.

* (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex F to MACV 1968 Command History," (SACSA).

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F -12/1968
FOOTNOT (C) ACTIONS ATTEMPTED AND ACCOMPLISHED - 1968 ()

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
<u>MARITIME OPERATIONS (by mission)</u>													
MMT/PSMAR (Interdiction/Intelligence Collection/ESTOPS)	(-) ⁹	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	17	27	12	15	0	0	71
MMT (Interdiction/Intelligence Collection)	2	13	13	10	13	14	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	54
	(6)	(5)	(4)	(3)	(0)	(0)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(18)
LORI (Interdiction/Intelligence Collection)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
CADD (Cross-Beach Operations)	0	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	0	0	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	0
	(1)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(3)	(1)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(5)
Special Reconnaissance	2	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	2
	(0)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(0)
Other	1	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	1
	(0)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(0)
<u>AIR OPERATIONS (by mission)</u>													
Leaflet/Gift Kits	4	2	5	3	4	9	4	7	5	4	0	0	47
	(1)	(0)	(2)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(2)	(1)	(1)	(0)	(-)	(-)	(7)
Radio Broadcast	17	21	21	19	25	22	22	24	22	23	15	20	251
	(0)	(2)	(4)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(1)	(2)	(4)	(2)	(16)
New Team Infiltration	(-)	(-)	2	1	4	3	5	3	2	2	0	0	22
	(-)	(-)	(0)	(3)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(-)	(-)	(14)
Agent Team Reinforcement	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
Agent Team Resupply	1	0	4	0	2	1	0	0	1	5	(-)	(-)	14
	(6)	(1)	(3)	(3)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(1)	(2)	(0)	(-)	(-)	(17)
Agent Team Exfiltration	(-)	(-)	1	2	2	2	4	5	3	2	(-)	(-)	21
	(-)	(-)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(-)	(-)	(1)
Special Reconnaissance	1	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	1	2	1	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	5
	(1)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(1)
<u>PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS</u>													
Grey Radio - Hours	1,023	730	888	936	906	780	812	812	812	812	812	812	10,135
Black Radio (RFD FIAG)-Hours	124	110	124	120	155	120	146	124	144	140	148	144	1,579
Black Radio (SSPT)-Hours	434	387	436	420	511.5	520	489	494	475	491	547.5	484	5,592
Black Propaganda Mail - lbs	518	669	563	577	714	569	695	627	484	484	348	358	6,606
Leaflets - Millions	20	10	14	5	18	18	15	10	6	5	0	0	109
Gift Kits	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	10
Gift Radios	0	0	1,297	400	680	300	1,120	220	0	500	0	0	4,537

Figures in parenthesis indicate unsuccessful attempts in addition to the successful missions

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FIGURE C-13 (TS)

FOOTBOY (e) ACTIONS ATTEMPTED AND ACCOMPLISHED - 1969 ()

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	Total
<u>MARITIME OPERATIONS (by mission)</u>							
MINT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
LOKI	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CADO	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Special Reconnaissance	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<u>AIR OPERATIONS (by mission)</u>							
Leaflet/Gift Kits	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Radio Rebroadcast	17 (6) ^{a/}	17 (2)	19 (5)	18 (2)	21 (4)	23 (3)	115 (22)
New Team Infiltration	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Agent Team Reinforcement	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Agent Team Resupply	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Agent Team Exfiltration	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Special Reconnaissance	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<u>PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS</u>							
Grey Radio - Hours	899	812	899	870	930	900	5,310
Black Radio (RED FLAG)-Hours	141	133	143	138	145	143	843
Black Radio (SSPL)-Hours	476.5	448.5	481.5	465	486.5	477.5	2,835.5
Black Propaganda Mail - Ltrs	306	302	286	283	278	268	1,723
Leaflets - Millions	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gift Kits	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gift Radios	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

^{a/} Figures in parenthesis indicate unsuccessful attempts in addition to the successful missions.

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FIGURE C-14 (TS)

LONG TERM AGENT TEAM SUMMARY ()

Total Number Agent Infiltrated	<u>240</u>
Killed in Drop	8
Killed in Action	33
Died of Sickness	33
Captured/or missing	146
Total Number Agents Lost	<u>220</u>
Total Number Agents Withdrawn	17 ^a /
Total Number Agents Exfiltrated	0
Total Number Agents Reporting	20 ^b /

^a/Team HANSEN (17) Withdrawn from friendly area in Laos.


Team never reached operational area in NVN and was never a reporting team. Thirteen members resigned.

^b/ (TS) REPORT, SACSA, "RED BOOK." 15 Dec 1968 (SACSA)

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FIGURE C-15 (TS)*



* (TS) Report, SACSA, "Red Book," July 1969 (SACSA).


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FIGURE C-16 (TS)*



* (TS) Report, SACSA, "Red Book," July 1969 (SACSA).

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
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FIGURE C-17 (TS)*

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* (TS) Report, SACSA, "Red Book," 15 Apr 1967 (SACSA).

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PART V. EVALUATIONS (S)

A. (TS) INTRODUCTION

1. (S) Scope. Part V, Evaluations, is a survey of the studies and evaluations conducted on the effectiveness of MACSOG in accomplishing the 34A/FOOTBOY(S) mission. A summary of the principal points brought out in each report is given. A more complete report on the studies, or portions of studies, focused on a particular program within FOOTBOY(S) can be found in the appropriate Annex to this appendix. The studies and reports discussed are available in the SACS file for more detailed perusal.

2. (TS) Background. Inadequate sources of information from within DRV has made the evaluation of the effectiveness of FOOTBOY(S) most difficult. Information from agent teams (TIMBERWORK(S)) has been very limited and increasingly suspect as more and more of the teams have been evaluated as compromised. Two other primary sources of evaluation material has been interrogations of NVN personnel captured through the Maritime Operations and various intercepted media emanating from Hanoi.

B. (TS) EARLY EVALUATIONS

1. (TS) January 1964. The general optimism concerning the expected effectiveness of 34A operations is reflected in the following comments from Ambassador Lodge in January 1964:

"I welcome exerting increased pressure on North Vietnam with the double aims of bringing about a cease-fire by VC and Pathet Lao and neutralizing North Vietnam, turning it into an oriental Yugoslavia. I do not think it profitable to try to overthrow Ho Chi Minh, as his successor would undoubtedly be tougher than he is."

2. (TS) December 1964. After a year of 34A operations, which were closely watched and generously supported by the highest level of government, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed general approval of the program in the following message:

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"The successful execution of the air and maritime operations of OPLAN-34A during the past year has been watched here with a great deal of interest by all levels. The DRV reactions to these operations have been most gratifying as reflected in various intercept media which have also been closely observed. Quite apart from the military objectives of these actions, they have served a very useful psychological purpose by keeping the DRV on alert through harassment and by maintaining pressure on defense forces."*

C. (TS) DIA EVALUATIONS

1. (TS) Intelligence Source. As discussed earlier, DIA became interested in 34A operations as a source of information during 1965. A DIA analysis of the intelligence value of the operations, conducted in 1967, concluded as follows:

"(S) The FOOTBOY(C) operations have frequently produced unique information of considerable intelligence value. While the TIMBERWORK(C) teams have experienced considerable operational hazards which limited their intelligence collection abilities, many of the reports from the teams contained details which were not otherwise available. Spot reports on roads and bridge construction greatly amplified overhead photography and added to or modified intelligence holdings on these strategic targets. PLOWMAN(C) missions reported useful information concerning NVN coastal defenses. Prisoner debriefings and interrogation reports provided needed information on NVN internal security within coastal provinces, and added information on NVN militia forces. During the January-July 1967 period, a total of 159 FOOTBOY(C) reports were published and DIA evaluated the contents of 79 of these reports. The results of these evaluations, expressed in percentiles, regarding the usability of reports were:

GREAT	8%
MODERATE	37%
SLIGHT	52%
NONE	1%***

2. (TS) Effect on DRV. In December 1967, SACSA requested an analysis by DIA of the impact of FOOTBOY (C) as part of a general review and reorientation of the program.*** The reports, published in January, included the following significant comments:

a. Although there was increase in alertness in coastal areas because of FOOTBOY(C), there was no evidence to indicate that regular units had been deployed to the coastal areas as a counteraction.

* (TS) Msg, JCS to CINCPAC/COMUSMACV, DTG 311534Z Dec 64, (SACSA).

** (TS) Report, DIA, "Inter-Service/JCS Study Group on FOOTBOY(C)," 13 Oct 1967.

*** (TS) Memo, SACSA to DIA, "FOOTBOY(C) - Analysis of Impact on NVN," 29 December 1967

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*** (TS) Memo, SACSA to DIA, "FOOTBOY(C) - Analysis of Impact on

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b. Because most of the report was based on interrogation of coastal population, a statement on the effect of FOOTBOY(C) on the whole of NVN was considered virtually impossible. A few of those interviewed were aware of the SSPL.

c. Morale was low in the villages, but apparently this was mainly from air strikes rather than from FOOTBOY(C) reactionary movement efforts.

d. There was no evidence to show that the NVN population was inclined to dispose of its Hanoi Government.

e. Intelligence obtained from the program is low-level and of little strategic value. PSYOPS and related activities, however, offer a great potential if further exploited.*

D. ~~(TS)~~ SACSA EVALUATIONS

1. (TS) Media Analysis. During 1967, there were increasing indications that the program of covert actions initiated in 1964 was achieving a significant impact on NVN. In addition to the DIA study covered in the preceding paragraph, SACSA directed his Special Operations Division to conduct an analysis of Hanoi media and other data to determine the impact of covert actions on North Vietnam and to identify psychological vulnerabilities. The abstract of this study** follows.

"This study, which responds to a requirement by the SACSA, attempts, by analysis of available information from NVN sources, to measure the impact of allied covert operations on the NVN regime and population and to identify broad areas of psychological vulnerability.

"North Vietnamese public media documents, intelligence information reports and summaries of the interrogations of the NVN personnel picked up during covert maritime operations provided the basic data. Statements and responses were broken down by subject matter and then recombined to provide broad statements of attitudes and conditions in NVN. These statements were then examined for indications of significant psychological vulnerabilities. Both because of the inherent nature of the subject and because of the non-availability of personnel trained in the more advanced techniques of analysis in the social science areas, the study is of a general and highly subjective nature.

~~* (TS) Report, DIA, "FOOTBOY(C) - Analysis of Impact on NVN (C)."~~
~~31 January 1968 (SACSA).~~

NOTE: Many of the articles used in this study can be found in the "NVN Reaction to OPLAN 34A" section of the SACSA weekly report available in SACSA Files.

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"The essential findings are summarized below:

"a. The requirement to maintain security and control in a closed society under conditions of extreme hardship has resulted in a high degree of central government sensitivity to perceive threats to government control. This sensitivity is manifested not only in increasing security efforts throughout NVN but also in growing governmental suspicion of elements of the NVN population. Decentralization is seen as one requirement for effective continuation of governmental processes. But decentralization threatens the centralized control inherent in a communist system. The cadres, religious groups and ethnic minorities appear to be especially suspect.

"b. Allied covert operations have contributed to a modest increase in the regime's sensitivity and have resulted in some measurable physical reactions which reflect a diversion of resources to security missions.

"c. There is evidence that allied psychological operations are reaching their targets. There is evidence of media/target differentiation -- radio broadcasts largely reach the upper levels of NVN society while printed media are more effective at the lower levels.

"d. The situation of the non-urban population is approaching that of bare survival. For a variety of cultural and physical reasons, this has resulted in an increasing pragmatism and dissociation from ideological considerations on the part of the people. There is widespread weariness of the war and its hardships. An additional effect of government control under these conditions of hardship has been an increasing alienation of the cadres from the people. In many cases, the cadres reinforce this alienation through their own venality. The situation suggests that psychological operations should be selected such that they are dysfunctional to the operative control process but functional to the felt needs of the people.

"These findings suggest that the most significant psychological vulnerabilities of the NVN people and regime are related to the following factors:

"a. Sensitivity of the Hanoi leadership to real or perceived threats to their political leadership and control.

"b. The pragmatic orientation of the peasants and farmers to matters that directly affect their struggle for survival.

"c. The contradiction between these two factors -- a contradiction that sets the results of the current policies of the regime against the welfare and survival of the general population.

"d. Actions to exploit vulnerabilities are limited by the inherent ethnic pride that would probably reject intervention by obviously external forces."

* (TS) Study Abstract, SACSA, "The Impact of Covert Actions Against North Vietnamese (TS)," February 1968 (SACSA).

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2. (TS) Additional Reaction. In a memorandum of 28 March 1968, SACSA forwarded to DEPSECDEF two additional indications, of the type included in the February study, which further supported the study conclusions:

"a. The New York Times, 22 March 1968, carries an Agence France-Presse story citing the North Vietnamese official publication Nhan Dan which describes a decree setting penalties up to death for counterrevolutionary and other offenses. The Nhan Dan article states that while the counterrevolutionaries are only a small force, 'their plotting is very deep and their activities very dangerous.' The Nhan Dan article cites a number of elements threatening the regime including 'other reactionary elements and saboteurs egged on by the imperialists, essentially by the United States imperialists.' The article also cites spies and commandos sent North by the United States imperialists.

"b. Dr. Le Vinh Can, a medical doctor trained in Hanoi, who ~~rallied on~~ 9 February 1968 at DAK TO, stated that he listened to Voice of the SSPL (VOSSPL), Radio Red Flag, and Saigon Radio while serving with the NVA in South Vietnam. Dr. Can, who is 34, said he used the 'unit's' radio, sometimes listening alone and sometimes with friends. He stated that the group who listened were split about 50-50 as to the sponsorship of SSPL. Half of them believed that the radio broadcast was sponsored by an intellectual group in NVN secretly operating in the North. The other half believed that the SSPL was sponsored by some kind of an intellectual group in the South. Dr. Can expressed the opinion that SSPL attacked Hanoi and the Lao Long Party about 80 per cent of the time and attacked the U.S., GVN and their allies the rest of the time. Although he and his friends listened to Radio Hanoi most of the time, because this could be done openly, they preferred to listen to SSPL and Red Flag. When they wanted information concerning war developments, Dr. Can said he tuned to Radio Saigon. He and his friends believed that Radio Red Flag was directed by Colonel Ly Van Quoc, a NVA officer who defected to Russia. They further believed that Russia provided the broadcasting facilities and that the Red Flag policy line was a genuine Communist one."*

*source of
questionable
truthfulness !!*

3. (TS) Later SACSA Evaluation. In preparing proposals for reorientation of FOOTBOY(C) in May of 1968, SACSA described, as background material, the results and achievements of the program to date in the following words:

* (TS) Memo, SACSA to DEPSECDEF, "FOOTBOY(C) - NVN Reaction (S)", 28 March 1968 (SACSA).

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"a. Agent team operations have been costly in human resources -- of 249 agents infiltrated into North Vietnam since February 1964, 47 survive. The intelligence collected by agent teams has been limited in quantity and marginal in value. These teams have had virtually no impact on the NVN economy although their presence has undoubtedly resulted in some diversion of NVN resources to internal security operations. However, the evidence reflects that, within the overall context of Hanoi's sensitivity to real or implied threats to its political control of the NVN population, Hanoi is seriously concerned over the presence of agents in their country and particularly over the possible links between these agents and 'reactionary elements' in the population.

*impact of an
confrontation of an
element, the NVN would
hardly believe that
'reactionary elements'
were a threat.*

"b. Maritime operations have produced intelligence which, while limited in scope, has been of moderate value. These operations have resulted in considerable expenditure of NVN energy in coastal defense operations and have had some measurable impact on fish production. More significantly, the maritime operations have enhanced the credibility of the SSPL and have established a reasonably sympathetic and exploitable contract between the SSPL and the fishing population in the coastal areas south of 20-00N.

"c. Psychological operations have evoked increasingly strident reaction from Hanoi, indicating an increasing concern regarding the effect of these operations on the spirit of the North Vietnamese people. Available evidence indicates that radio operations are reaching an audience primarily concentrated among military personnel, the NVN cadres, and the better educated North Vietnamese. Interrogation of prisoners and defectors in SVN and Laos has indicated that Radio RED FLAG and VOSSPL, in particular, have reached a significant audience that holds a rather high respect for the credibility of these stations. Leaflets seem to have had their greatest impact among the fishing population of the coastal areas. All of the media employed have drawn reaction from the Hanoi regime.

"d. Conclusion. So long as the current policies of the regime appear to be leading to the achievement of the regime's political objectives, the regime is unlikely to alter those policies. However, should the regime perceive that continuation of its policies is likely to result in diminution or possible loss of its political control over the population of North Vietnam, re-evaluation of the policies could be expected. Therefore, the specific operational task which should infuse the entire FOOTBOY(C) program is to implant the thought within the ruling hierarchy that their control of the North Vietnamese population is decreasing and is likely to decrease further unless policy changes are made; that insofar as prosecution of the war is concerned, their ability to mobilize the physical and human resources of North Vietnam without arousing effective internal opposition is dissipating..."

* (TS) Paper, SACSA, "FOOTBOY(C) - Revised Concept for Covert Actions Against North Vietnam (TS)," May 1968, (SACSA).

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~~TOP SECRET~~~~E. (TS) MACSOG EVALUATION~~

On 4 November 1968, MACSOG's counterpart, the STD, completed a study entitled, "RVN Study on NVN Reactions to Cessation of Bombing and Curtailment of SSPL Activities." The study consists of official NVN statements evincing regime concern for the FOOTBOY(C) program, reports of the capture and destruction of both commando teams and commando boats, and source reports on HUMIDOR(C) radio broadcasts and leaflet activities. The theme of the study is that the FOOTBOY(C) program has been effective. It concludes that Hanoi will be able to destroy the credibility of SSPL by noting the simultaneous curtailment of FOOTBOY(C) activities and the US bombing of NVN. The conclusion paragraphs from the study are quoted below:

"From the data presented, it is apparent that although there are people who do believe that the SSPL is in fact an NVN dissident organization, the Government and its functionaries are convinced that it is a GVN/US organization. People who have come in contact with the SSPL, either directly or through radio or leaflets are told by the cadres that the SSPL is based in SVN. With the advent of a bombing halt and the concurrent cessation of SSPL maritime and leaflet operations, the DRV will be provided with a powerful propaganda weapon. They can now point to two instances in which limitations upon overt US activities have been adhered to by the SSPL. We can expect a consequent loss of credibility when it becomes apparent that there are no more maritime operations or leaflet drops. The people along the coast from the 19th parallel south have long expressed their belief and faith in the SSPL. They cannot be long expected to maintain that faith in the face of cadre exhortations and the proof provided by the restriction of SSPL operations.

"Radio listening audiences will undoubtedly be subject to the same propaganda but it is less likely to have an effect on them since they have never actually come into contact with the SSPL. For that same reason, however, they are gradually losing any belief they once had in the reality of SSPL."

~~F. (TS) CINCPAC EVALUATIONS~~

1. (TS) 1967 Survey. In October 1967, General Westmoreland, in a message** to CINCPAC and JCS, pointed out that OPLAN 34A (1963) with various amendments and additions was still the charter for MACSOG operations. Although the tempo of the war

* (TS) Study, STD, "RVN Study on NVN Reactions to Cessation of Bombing and Curtailment of SSPL Activities," 4 November 1968, p.14, (SACSA).

** (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV, DTG 160230Z Oct 67.

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** (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV, DTG 160230Z Oct 67

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and the strategic situation in Southeast Asia had materially changed since the promulgation of this charter, no overall review or analysis had been made of MACSOG operations. He requested that a joint Washington team with CIA and CINCPAC representation be made available to conduct such a review. After consultation between JCS and CINCPAC, it was decided that the group should be under the chairmanship of a CINCPAC representative, with CIA, DIA and Service representatives as members.*

a. Team Schedule. The 15-man team assembled on 1 November 1967 at CINCPAC Headquarters. The team met for two days at CINCPAC, spent six days at MACSOG Headquarters, and four days back at CINCPAC to develop recommendations. The team made clear in its report that the limited time afforded for the review precluded a comprehensive analysis of MACSOG programs and operations.**

b. Report. The survey team was divided into five sub-committees, one of which was assigned the FOOTBOY(C) program. The report covered TIMBERWORK(C), HUMIDOR(C), and PLOWMAN(C) operations, each in a separate appendix. For each program, background, current operations, and recommendations were given. The conclusion, recommendations, and CINCPAC comments on the FOOTBOY(C) portion of the report is given below:

(1) Conclusion. That the present FOOTBOY(C) program should be reoriented and its efforts be directed toward the expansion of the SSPL and the collection of intelligence.

(2) Recommendations

(a) That the present FOOTBOY(C) program be reoriented and its efforts be directed toward:

* (TS) Memo, SACSA to Director Joint Staff, "FOOTBOY(C) - Comprehensive Review of MACSOG Programs (C)", 17 October 1967, (SACSA).

** (TS) Report, "Review of MACSOG Programs," Joint Survey Team, 17 November 1967, p.2. (SACSA).

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1. Promoting disorganization in NVN by inducing a belief in the existence of widespread dissidence (expansion of SSPL).

2. Collecting intelligence in NVN and its coastal waters.

(b) That higher authorities assign a general mission, essentially is stated above, and should grant COMUSMACV authority to conduct operations in support of the mission at his discretion, limited only by an approved, broad concept of operations.

CINCPAC Comment: Non-concur. Agree that a new FOOTBOY(G) mission statement should be provided but consider that current approval procedures are adequate and should remain in effect.

(c) With respect to ~~TIMBERWORK(C)~~, reorient the present program as follows:

1. De-emphasize the infiltration of long-term black teams, limiting operations to low-level intelligence nets and secure base areas in tribal areas.

2. Continue operations with existing teams to maximize intelligence collection possibilities and to support the development of SSPL.

3. Institute short-term deception/harassment/physical destruction operation in NVN utilizing teams of sanitized ARVN rangers.

4. Augment STRATA teams with US personnel and conduct operations against selected targets.

CINCPAC Comment: Approval should be requested on a case-by-case basis.

(d) With respect to ~~PLOWMAN(G)~~:

1. Conduct MAROPS in such a manner as to support the mission outlined in paragraph 1 above.

2. Expand operations toward obtaining better geographic coverage.

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(e) With respect to HUMIDOR(C):

1. Continue operations along the lines presently planned by SOG which includes a broad expansion of SSPL and an increase in its credibility as a dissident organization.

2. The SSPL should provide the central theme around which most FOOTBOY(C) operations are planned and conducted.

3. Maximum use of diversion and deception in TIMBERWORK(C) and FLOWMAN(C) should be employed to support the SSPL concept as well as to induce disorganization in NVN.

(f) Attention should continue to be given to the development of the RVN capability to conduct covert operations unilaterally following a standdown.*

c. Follow-up Action. On 17 March 1968, COMUSMACV forwarded to CINCPAC a consolidated list of recommendations made by the survey team and the comments and/or action being taken by CINCPAC and MACSOG. The portion of the report concerned with FOOTBOY(C) operations is quoted in full below. These comments represent a summary of MACSOG thinking and objectives just prior to the bombing halt restrictions on 1 April 1968.

"(1) JOINT SURVEY TEAM COMMENT: FOOTBOY(C) planning and operations are still predicated on OPLAN 34A which was developed prior to ROLLING THUNDER and SEA DRAGON. The program still contains a number of residuals from the original concept. The FOOTBOY(C) program should concentrate on objectives which can only or best be accomplished by covert means.

"RECOMMENDATION: COMUSMACV should initiate action to reorient the present FOOTBOY(C) program and direct its efforts toward promoting disorganization in NVN by inducing a belief in the existence of widespread dissidence (expansion of SSPL).

"MACV COMMENT: The SSPL theme will be a basic element of training for all teams, long and short term, with the exception of those teams planned with US personnel participation. In all contacts with NVN, the teams will project the SSPL image. New TIMBERWORK(C) agent teams will be briefed as follows: GVN and her allies have contacted the Sacred Sword Patriot's League, a resistance group in NVN, and despite the fact that they disagree with some of their stated aims, the

* (TS) Ibid., p.C1-3.

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GVN has agreed to support the SSPL's operations in NVN. In return the SSPL has agreed not to oppose the GVN by her cells in SVN. The agent team should regard itself as SSPL activists. Sub-sources should be recruited as SSPL members and assisted in forming local SSPL cells. Teams must be trained in SSPL doctrine and in their stated role as 'Allies of SSPL.' The teams must believe they are supporting a real political force which may not yet have spread to their area of operation and thus requires their assistance in organization. They must believe that they are the 'advance men.' The development of psychological programs and PLOWMAN(C) operations to further support this recommendation are covered in subsequent paragraphs.

"(2) JOINT SURVEY TEAM COMMENT: The evolutionary development of FOOTBOY(C) program since its inception has resulted in a complex matrix of concepts, procedures, and execution authorities. This matrix has inhibited the timely exploitation of opportunities, has caused inordinate delays while execution authority is obtained from higher authorities and is inconsistent with the principle of freedom of action by a commander to carry out his assigned mission.

"RECOMMENDATION: COMUSMACV should recommend that he be assigned a FOOTBOY(C) mission, essentially as stated above and grant COMUSMACV authority to conduct operations in support of the mission at his discretion, limited only by an approved, broad concept of operations.

"CINCPAC COMMENT: Non-concur. Agree that a new FOOTBOY(C) mission statement should be provided but consider that current approved procedures are adequate and should remain in effect.

"MACV COMMENT: COMUSMACV considers the present mission statement for MACSOG to be satisfactory, as well as the current approval procedures. The mission statement is interpreted by this headquarters to be as follows: As directed by CINCPAC, MACV will advise, train and support ARVN military and paramilitary forces in out-of-country unconventional and psychological activities and will exercise operational control of MACSOG assets. This broad concept provides COMUSMACV the latitude necessary to conduct all phases of MACSOG out-of-country operations. Further, it provides a tool for CINCPAC to direct these activities. It is recommended that the FOOTBOY(C) mission statement not be changed.

"(3) JOINT SURVEY TEAM COMMENT: Current intelligence indicates that TIMBERWORK(C) long-term team operations and PLOWMAN(C) operations, as well as HUMIDOR(C) operations related to the existence of a notional dissident organization (SSPL) in NVN, have caused serious concern in Hanoi and have resulted in the diversion of NVN military and civil resources to internal and coastal security. At the same time, TIMBERWORK(C) long-term team operations have produced marginal intelligence and have resulted in high losses.

"RECOMMENDATION: Exploit the opportunity to increase disorganization and tension within NVN while continuing to collect intelligence by all means available. To this end, COMUSMACV should initiate action to integrate all FOOTBOY(C) operations (less STRATA teams operations) into the SSPL theme.

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"MACV COMMENT: Non-concur. All FOOTBOY(C) operations less STRATA, utilizing US personnel, will be coordinated to support the SSPL theme.

"RECOMMENDATION: De-emphasize actual TIMBERWORK(C) long-term operations while retaining the appearance of continued operations for cover purposes.

"MACV COMMENT: Concur. The introduction of four teams is considered the minimum number required to retain the appearance of continued operations. It is therefore recommended that the introduction of four new long-term teams or replacements for existing teams be approved for introduction into NVN in FY 69.

"RECOMMENDATION: Institute short-term deception/harassment/physical destruction operations in NVN utilizing teams of sanitized ARVN Rangers.

"MACV COMMENT STRATA Teams will be built up to the programmed level of 10 (15 men) volunteer teams utilizing trained and experienced VN elite troops (Rangers, Marines, Airborne and LLDB) to the greatest possible extent. These teams will be trained to perform passive roadwatch, harassment/destruction, and SSPL missions.

"RECOMMENDATION Continue PLOWMAN(C) operations in support of psychological and intelligence objectives.

"MACV COMMENT: Concur. PLOWMAN(C) operations are being continued in support of psychological and intelligence objectives.

"RECOMMENDATION: Undertake a program to expand the SSPL and increase its credibility through establishment of notional cells in third countries, improvement of SSPL propaganda quality along lines presently being pursued by MACSOG, and conduct of an extensive deception/diversion program as now being planned by MACSOG.

"MACV COMMENT: The following steps have been taken or are programmed:

"(a) 1968 resolution advocating stronger SSPL line was broadcast over VOSSPL and published in the January 68 newsletter.

"(b) Announcement of various notional special interest groups and leaders associated with the league were made through commentaries on the Third National Congress activities.

"(c) Reports on activities (notional) of international cells located in Bangkok, Udorn, Vientiane, Saigon, and Paris to be aired over VOSSPL to lay groundwork for possible future establishment of real cells in those cities.

"(d) Establish additional SSPL Post Office boxes in Saigon, Udorn, Vientiane, and Paris.

"(e) Organize a SVN cell with defectors helped south by the League.

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"(f) Write peace appeals to third country VN delegations, selected third country leaders and international peace groups.

"(g) Begin printing of specialized leaflets for third SSPL printing zone (Mar 68).

"(h) Assign specialized missions to selected detainees. Planting of SSPL flags, marking of buildings with SSPL slogans and symbols, contacting members, establishing cells, collecting money.

"(i) Begin selected target appeals through SSPL printing zones based on conditions in that specific zone (Apr 68).

"(j) Write appeals for support to third country organizations.

"(k) Begin printing of specialized leaflets for the fourth SSPL printing zone (Apr 68).

"(l) Develop a league hero: Notional killing of Dr. Ngo-Van-Son, Chief of League's Culture, Medical and Social Bureau by Lao Dong Party Assassination Team.

"(m) Purge central committee member for corruption and execute him.

"(4) JOINT SURVEY TEAM COMMENT: ~~TIMBERWORK(C)~~ STRATA Teams offer an opportunity to obtain critically needed tactical intelligence in the southern portion of NVN. However, the effectiveness of these teams is limited by the fact that their composition is entirely indigenous. PRAIRIE FIRE and DANIEL BOONE have demonstrated the efficiency of using U.S. advisors with similar teams.

"RECOMMENDATION: COMUSMACV should recommend employment of U.S. advisors with STRATA Teams in target acquisition/road-watch mission in NVN. STRATA Teams with U.S. advisors should be compartmented from FOOTBOY operations related to the SSPL.

"CINCPAC COMMENT: Approval should be requested on a case-by-case basis.

"MACV COMMENT: MACSOG presently has a requirement under study for including U.S. advisors with STRATA Teams. There is some opposition from VN counterparts on use of U.S. personnel. A request for authority to employ U.S. personnel with STRATA Teams, on a case by case basis as determined by MACV, will be submitted when it is deemed advisable.

"(5) JOINT SURVEY TEAM COMMENT: The number of PTF's available for ~~PLOWMAN(C)~~ operations determines, to a large extent, the frequency of operations and hence the number of intelligence sources obtained and the geographic areas from which they are obtained. Seven PTF's are now available for PLOWMAN(C). Ten new PTF's are under construction. Requirement for assignment of PTF's to programs other than PLOWMAN(C) will require a decision by higher headquarters as to the PTF force level for PLOWMAN(C).

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"RECOMMENDATION. COMUSMACV should request confirmation that 14 PTF's, to be manned by indigenous crews, will be assigned for use in PLOWMAN(C). (The OPNAV representative on the Survey Team has placed in the record a recommendation that the PLOWMAN(C) PTF force consist of 10 PTF's manned by indigenous crews and 4 PTF's manned by U.S. crews.

"CINCPAC COMMENT: To support the expansion of the SSPL and maintain the covert aspects of PLOWMAN(C), a force level of fourteen PTF's should be manned by indigenous crews.

"MACV COMMENT. Concur with the CINCPAC comment concerning the manning of all PLOWMAN(C) PTF's with indigenous crews in order to support the expansion of the SSPL. JCS 9296/062026Z Feb 68 reflects the fact that the MACSOG inventory of PTF's will be fourteen."*

2. (TS) Admiral McCain's Evaluation. In November 1968, Admiral 1
McCain, CINCPAC, gave a succinct evaluation of the FOOTBOY(C) 2
program in a message on the general subject of unconventional 3
warfare. Applicable portions of the message are quoted below: 4

"a. Special operations directed against North Vietnam have been designed to create widespread dissidence through the conduct of deceptive psychological warfare activities, to cause scarce NVN resources to be diverted to internal security and coastal defense, and to collect useful intelligence. Due to the covert nature of these programs, quantifiable results which would satisfy the requirement of systems analysts are difficult to come by. Because of the strict censorship of NVN press and radio, and close government control and surveillance of the indigenous population, only a limited amount of information relating to the effectiveness of these programs can be derived without resorting to detailed indirect analyses. Despite these difficulties however, we have been able to generalize on the effectiveness of certain aspects of these programs and concepts of operations as we see them at this point in time.

"b. Indications are that STRATA Team operations, which commenced in September 1967, have been generally unproductive. While these operations were designed primarily for the purpose of gathering intelligence relating to enemy infiltration, logistics supply systems, positions, and related matters in North Vietnam, the intelligence derived from these operations has been very low level in character and, with the possible exception of providing some information for E&E planning, has not otherwise been useful. Failure of these operations may be partially attributed to the policy which prohibits US personnel from accompanying these indigenous STRATA Teams. By contrasting PRAIRIE FIRE and DANIEL BOONE operations, which are quite similar in nature, have been relatively successful probably due in part to participation by US personnel. It is indicated that future PACOM contingency planning for these types of activities in other areas should particularly emphasize careful selection and training of team members as well.

* (TS) Report, COMUSMACV, "Report of Review of MACSOG Programs (C)," 17 March 1968, p. 9-14, (SACSA).

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"c. PLOWMAN (C) operations have exhibited some positive accomplishments. Perhaps the best 'hard' intelligence relating to the effectiveness of the MK-36 destructor, for example, has been derived from interrogation of PLOWMAN (C) prisoners. These interrogations have also assisted in providing an insight into economic and other conditions prevailing in NVN. There are indications that considerable NVN resources have been diverted to countering PLOWMAN (C) as evidenced by the encounters with armed and steel hulled junks, and establishment of coastal defensive positions. The shrill NVN denouncement of 'The crime of banditry in remote or coastal areas for counterrevolutionary purpose' and demanding 'an end to dropping of leaflets, psychological war commandoes (SIC) and kidnapping of North Vietnamese' further indicate North Vietnam's deep concern of the impact these programs may be achieving.

"d. Indications at this time are that the long-term agent team program has been almost a complete failure in terms of the amount of useful intelligence produced. The basic concept in tactics and techniques for long-term agent team operations need to be re-examined again before these types of operations are included in future contingency plans. Long-term agent team and notional teams in combination, however, may have tied up a considerable amount of the enemy's internal security resources.

"e. The value of the covert PSYOPS HUMIDOR (C) programs is difficult to assess directly. There are indications in articles published in NVN that the Hanoi Government may be deeply concerned about these operations. Instructions have been issued to the cadre outlining actions to be taken to counter radio broadcasts, gift kits, third country letters, SSPL activities, etc. A considerable amount of analysis of all source information is indicated in this subject area."*

3. (TS) CINCPAC Post Bombing Halt Conference. On the day FOOTBOY (C) 1
operations, along with bombing the North, were restricted, I 2
November 1968, CINCPAC also called for a one-day working level 3
conference to review the future plans for the continuance of 4
FOOTBOY (C). This conference convened on 5 November 1968 at 5
CINCPAC Headquarters with representatives from JCS, CINCPAC, 6
COMUSMACV and MACSOG attending. The two sections of the report 7
that concern the future of the FOOTBOY (C) program are 8
included below: 9

"a. LEVEL OF FOOTBOY (C) OPERATIONS DURING FULL-SCALE NEGOTIATIONS.

"(1) Discussion:

"(a) Upon the advent of full scale negotiations and resulting reconsideration of on-going and potential covert activities in and against NVN, the consensus of the conferees was that modification of current guidance on FOOTBOY (C) operations would be appropriate.

* (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 160437Z Nov 68 (SACSA).

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* (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 160437Z Nov 68 (SACSA).

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"(b) The new thrust of the FOOTBOY (C) program could be toward realistic alignment of operation to the changing political/military climate. This would mean deescalation/termination of some portions of the program, changes in rules of engagement and tempo of operation in others, with strict maintenance of present MACSOG personnel and material assets. The foregoing would be necessary to provide an immediate readiness posture in case of a decision to resume full scale covert operations due to a prolongation of the peace talks or other displays of lack of faith on the part of the NVN.

"(c) Activities should be conducted to accomplish a two-fold effect:

"1. To exert increased, non-attributable pressure against the NVN in order to influence makers to adopt a more conciliatory attitude during the peace negotiations.

"2. To assist in maintaining the desired relationship with GVN counterparts, and, at the same time, demonstrate USG resolve during this period.

"(2) Recommendations:

"(a) TIMBERWORK (C):

"1. Long-Term Agent Teams: These teams will have limited usefulness and potential during the peace negotiations and should be terminated on an attrition basis in consonance with the demonstrated progress of the talks.

"2. STRATA: These teams should not be targeted against NVN territory during the sensitive negotiations. They should be maintained in a high state of operational readiness for immediate resumption of operations by integration in and employment with PRAIRIE FIRE teams.

"3. FORAE (C): Diversionary operations including resupply and reinforcement of notional teams in NVN should be undertaken. Specific operations should be proposed on a case-by-case basis.

"(b) PLOWMAN (C):

"1. If substantive progress is not made in negotiations within a reasonable period, PLOWMAN (C) patrol and interrogation operations should be re-instituted in international waters for purpose of intelligence collection, surveillance, and to deliver newsletters and other PSYOPS materials. In the event this results in NVN withdrawal of junks inside their territorial waters, it would be advisable to consider, on a case-by-case basis PLOWMAN (C) operations within the 12 NM limit for surveillance and intelligence collection operations.

"2. Where a high priority intelligence target in the NVN coastal area and capable agent assets exist, approval of insertion of intelligence agents by PTF or indigenous craft should be requested on a case-by-case basis.

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~~TOP SECRET~~~~"(c) HUMIDOR (C):~~

"1. Leaflet Operations. That the capability for the production and dissemination of leaflets be maintained. In the event of prolongation of negotiations, recommendations will be submitted to dispense leaflets from release points outside NVN territorial limits.

"2. Radio Operations. That on-going BLACK and GRAY radio operations be continued.

"3. BLACK Letters: That operations continue on a reduced basis.

"4. That the capability for the timely development and procurement of appropriate PSYOPS materials be maintained.

~~"(d) MIDRIFF (C):~~ That current assets and capability be maintained in a high state of readiness for possible resumption or operations.

"b. LEVEL OF FOOTBOY (C) OPERATIONS AFTER CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

"(1) Discussion: In accordance with existing U.S. national directives, control and direction of covert operations against NVN would revert to CAS. Termination of the military sponsored covert programs and/or turnover to CAS to be accomplished at a schedule to be determined.

"(2) Recommendations:

"(a) That SOG be reconfigured as a Joint Special Operations Advisory Detachment.

"(b) That STD be reorganized and assigned a new role as the Special Operations Staff element of the JGS.

"(c) That the RVNAF be advised and assisted in the development of a small but high quality Special Operations capability.

"(d) That an appropriate number of PTFs be continued on loan to RVNAF.

"(e) That selected VNAF air assets be earmarked for support of an improved GVN Special Operations capability.

"(f) That indigenous ground force assets now under SOG control be disbanded and efforts directed toward the improvement of the LLDB (ARVN Special Forces) within the ARVN force structure.

"(g) That provision be made for appropriate U.S. Advisory Detachments for GVN air, ground and naval Special Operations elements.

"(h) That the BLACK PSYOPS assets be transferred to CAS.

"(i) That, in the event the USG does not desire to retain the VOF assets, these assets be transferred to GVN."*

* (PS) Report, CINCPAC, "Conference on MACSOG Programs," 6 Nov 1968, (SACSA).

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~~TOP SECRET~~H. (TS) COMUSMACV EVALUATIONS

1. (TS) 1965 Report. In August 1965 General Westmorland directed that members of the MACV staff examine the current program for the execution of OPLAN 34A and make recommendations for future actions in support of this plan. The study devoted considerable space to the problem of command and control as between MACV and MACSOG and the associated problems of coordination with CAS and U.S. Special Forces. Three portions of the study are quoted below: Effectiveness, Conclusions and Recommendations.

"a. Effectiveness of 34A Operation

"(1) All combat operations in SEA which cannot be followed up by the introduction of substantial ground forces have one common deficiency -- lack of good information on overall effectiveness. This has been true of in-country air strikes, including the use of B-52's, as well as air strikes in LAOS and in DRV. It is equally true in the case of 34A operations. Some individual results are known, but the overall effectiveness of the 34A program, and specifically, the MAROPS, AIROPS, Airborne, or PSYOPS portions of the program, is difficult to evaluate accurately.

"(2) It has been stated previously in the report that MAROPS and in-place teams are sources of information on DRV activities. A great deal of this information is obtained from LOKI and SWALLOW (Kidnap) operations which continue to be highly successful. Considerable COMINT is gathered in AIROPS and from the DRV reaction to MAROPS. From the standpoint of intelligence collection, 34A operations are judged to be extremely successful.

"(3) Probably the most obvious reaction by the DRV to 34A operations is caused by the PSYOPS program. References to gift packages and leaflet drops are often made in the DRV press and radio, and DRV prisoners who have been captured are for the most part well aware of this program.

"(4) The difficulties which have been encountered in the AIROPS program have already been discussed (paragraph 3g above). However, it is fair to say that recently the program has had a greater degree of success than during the first five months of 1965. Since there are no other practical alternatives to the use of air for resupply and reinforcement of the teams now in place, this program must continue, regardless of the acknowledged difficulties. Should the DRV night-intercept capability improve to the point where these operations become prohibitive, certain major decisions will have to be faced concerning this part of the SOG program.

"(5) One well known effect of the MAROPS program has been the substantial effort which the DRV has invested in coastal security. As an example, security posts are now constructed at 5-8 km intervals with outposts frequently at 2 km intervals. In addition, constant beach patrols are maintained at night by 5-7 man teams along the coastal areas south of the 20th parallel. Villagers must go to their designated posts each time an alert is sounded, which is in effect any time a MAROPS mission is run north of the 17th Parallel. The continuous pressure resulting from these missions cannot help but have a substantial

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IS SOUNDED, WHICH IS AN EFFECT ANY TIME A MAROPS MISSION IS

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impact upon the DRV. Some indication of this is received in DRV press and radio releases which have violently denounced these "pirates".

"(6) Although any one of the known effects taken singly would not normally be classified as a major pressure against the DRV, the accumulation of the known and the unknown adds up to a major harassment of (and embarrassment to) the Hanoi government. Looking at this program through Hanoi's eyes, it is likely that the potential of these operations in the form of major attacks against selected installations, of resistance activities, and other possible actions presents as many problems as do the actual operations themselves. Therefore, summing up the actual and probable results of the 34A operations, it is the opinion of the study group that the program is successful and is in fact applying considerable pressures against the DRV which could not be accomplished in any other way under current national policy. Thus 34A is considered an effective and productive program.

"b. Conclusions. The following conclusions have been drawn as a result of the foregoing study.

"(1) The execution of OPLAN 34A continues to be necessary and appropriate despite the fact that overt air operations are now being conducted against the DRV. 34A operations are currently contributing to the graduated pressures against the DRV which national policy demands. In addition, continuous utilization of the capabilities currently available to SOG provides an immediate capability to apply non-attributable military pressure against the DRV in case the decision is made to cease overt air operations north of the 17th Parallel. Finally, 34A operations, and the organization which is now implementing them, provide the groundwork for the development of a resistance effort in North Vietnam should a decision at national level ever call for such operations.

"(2) In general, the program is properly oriented both in size and scope. Plans now under preparation will provide a more manageable airborne operation and will be more appropriately oriented toward the development of a viable groundwork for resistance operations if the requirement should be established. MAROPS as they are currently being executed are an extremely valuable source of intelligence and an effective harassment program. Additionally, the capability to direct operations at specific targets with selectivity provides a valuable adjunct to the punitive operations as well as to the ongoing psychological warfare program. The AIROPS program as it is currently being conducted appears to be the least productive as well as the most difficult of the SOG efforts. It is, however, a vital adjunct to the airborne program and thus must be continued. Finally, the PSYWAR effort as now implemented by SOG is an extremely important part of the overall program and should remain generally at the same level and scope. The "White Radio" could appropriately be placed under JUSPAC however, considering the current capabilities of JUSPAC and the recent agreement between SOG and JUSPAC, it appears that no change is appropriate at this time.

"(3) SOG is the proper organization to implement the 34A mission. It is basically well established and is involved in daily operations which have a reasonably high record of success. Its relationship with CAS is well established;

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its communications, aircraft support and boat resources are operating daily. Because of SOG's experience with this program, sound methods of operating and tested procedures have been developed. To attempt to transfer this program at this time to any other organization appears to be unnecessary and in fact infeasible without a resulting substantial degradation of capability.

"(4) There do not appear to be any compelling reasons why SOG should not continue in the SHIPING BRASS program and JUWTF planning area. With the proper manning, these missions are not competitive with the execution of the 34A Plan and can be more appropriately accomplished by SOG than any other existing organization within MACV. Additionally, if other out-of-country covert unconventional warfare operations of primary interest to MACV should develop, it is the opinion of the study group that these also should be placed under SOG with the necessary additional assets.

"(5) SOG should be clearly established as a task force in the MACV command channels. The necessary staff relationships should be developed by MACV using a minimum number of personnel, clearly identified to SOG; however, extreme caution must be taken to insure the complete security of the 34A mission within the MACV staff. Additionally, every effort should be made at the MACV level and higher to insure maximum participation by CAS in all of SOG's operations.

"(6) SOG should be alert to the very real possibility that their operations could be the basis for the development of a resistance movement within the DRV, should a change in national policy occur. SOG programs should be oriented in such a way that the ongoing efforts could be quickly and effectively converted toward this end.

"(7) None of the alternatives to the current 34A program which were examined were determined to be desirable at this time. To attempt any major change in the nature, scope, organizational arrangement, or general extent of 34A operations at this time could jeopardize the effectiveness of the whole program.

"(8) A clear statement of mission for MACV (in relation to SOG's activities) and for SOG by higher headquarters is required.

"(9) "Skyhook" C-130 aircraft would be more appropriate than the C-123's currently in use for AIROPS in support of 34A.

"(10) Greater emphasis should be placed upon special operations and unconventional warfare planning for Southeast Asia as a whole. In this respect, expedited approval for the proposed JTD increase providing manpower authorization of the JUWTF planning section in SOG is required, and manning of this section when approved should be undertaken on an emergency basis.

"(11) The one area in which an expanded program on a long range basis appears to be desirable is the MAROPS program.

"(12) A program to replace air crews lost to combat or other operational attrition is required.

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~~TOP SECRET~~"c. Recommendations

"(1) Continue the 34A program as it is presently established and/or projected, with increases in quantity and quality of activities consistent with current and projected resources.

"(2) Expedite approval of proposed SOG JTD and take action to obtain increased authorization for personnel to accomplish the SHINING BRASS mission.

"(3) Issue proposed mission statement for SOG and take necessary action to obtain CINCPAC approval for proposed statement of MACV mission on unconventional warfare activities.

"(4) Clearly establish SOG as a task force under COMUSMACV.

"(5) Formalize staff contacts with SOG with maximum emphasis on minimum proliferation of knowledge of SOG's activities throughout the MACV staff.

"(6) Commence expedited unilateral planning for resistance operations in the DRV.

"(7) Reinstate action to obtain "Skyhook" C-130's for SOG.

"(8) Initiate a programmed flow of trained aircrews as replacements for combat and other losses.

"(9) Initiate long range planning for expanding MAROPS program." *

2. (TS) Brownfield Report

a. Background. Closely following the CINCPAC survey of November 1967, COMUSMACV tasked BG A. R. Brownfield to chair an AD HOC Evaluation Group (AHEG) to examine the operations of the Studies and Observation Group (SOG) to determine whether the results achieved were commensurate with the resources committed. The report, 14 Feb 68, thoroughly covered each of SOG's programs with regard to mission, operation, assets, results, and gave the AHEG conclusions. Also, included in their report were the recommendations of the CINCPAC survey team, related as appropriate to the findings of the AD HOC Evaluation Group.

* (RS) STUDY, MACV, Review of JPLAN 34A, 8 Sept 1965, P16, 21-23.
(SACSA)

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b. Conclusions and Recommendations. A summary of the more and 1
significant conclusions and recommendations is scheduled below: 2

"(1) PLOWMAN (C)

"(a) CONCLUSION The mission of PLOWMAN (C) should be to
revised to take into consideration similar missions being
performed by other forces and those missions from which
PLOWMAN (C) has had or can expect to have the best results.

"RECOMMENDATION. That the mission of PLOWMAN (C) be
conduct covert maritime operations with RVN personnel in the
costal waters of NVN in order to.

"1. Support the HUMIDOR and TIMBERWORK Programs.

"2. Collect intelligence.

"3. Conduct small scale cross the beach operations
in support of missions (a) and (b) above.

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"(b) CONCLUSION While cost effectiveness is not a practical means of evaluating operations of this nature, the cost, and the current and projected resources devoted to PLOWMAN (C) are considered to be excessive for the results to be obtained.

"RECOMMENDATION That not more than ten PTFs, 12 PTF crews and three Action Teams be assigned to PLOWMAN (C) which is considered adequate to launch 31 missions per month.

"(c) CONCLUSION. That there is a need for long range planning and operational evaluation in order to achieve the maximum results. Further, that coordination with other forces, while presently in being, would be improved if scheduled PLOWMAN (C) operation were made known to these forces, such as SEA DRAGON, for a period longer than one week.

"RECOMMENDATION That COMUSMACV submit to CINCPAC for approval on a monthly basis a detailed plan covering a period of one month so that COMUSMACV could carry out day-to-day operations at his discretion and so that other forces operating in the same or adjacent areas could effect longer range planning. Further that approval be requested to operate freely in areas north of 17° north latitude rather than have to adhere to a predetermined track.

"(2) HUMIDOR (C)

"(a) CONCLUSION: The PSYOP mission of SOG is not clear and too broad.

"RECOMMENDATION: That the following mission and tasks be approved for SOG PSYOP:

"Mission: Conduct, assist and advise the Strategic Technical Directorate in conducting covert strategic and psychological operations against NVN leadership and populace to achieve maximum harassment and division, and to develop the PSYOP section of the General Political Warfare Department to conduct covert PSYOP against the National Liberation Front (NLF), creating division between the NLF and the LAO DONG Party (NVN) and among the leaders of the NLF. Further, work to achieve maximum discontent within the NVN cadre and the VC.

"Conduct non-attributable (gray) propaganda, principally through the Voice of Freedom, to support the US mission in Vietnam and as a cover for covert operations.

"COVERT TASKS:

"1. Create the impression of growing internal opposition to the government of NVN.

"2. Format and exploit popular dissatisfaction with NVN government policies.

"3. Create dissention and distrust among the cadre and between the people and the cadre.

"4. Foster passive resistance to the NVN government programs.

"5. Establish a base for potential active opposition to the NVN government.

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"5. Establish a base for potential active opposition to the NVN government.

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"6. Create the impression of a split within the leadership of NVN government.

"7. Promote the diversion of resources.

"8. Create dissention and distrust between the NVN government and the people of NVN and Communist China.

"NON-ATTRIBUTABLE TASKS

"1. Maintain the credibility of VOF.

"2. Extend the coverage of VOF and the target audience through expansion of programming

"3. Inform the people of NVN of the defeats suffered by the NVA and the VC.

"4. Emphasize the growing strength of and popular support for GVN.

"(b) CONCLUSION: A long range plan needs to be developed for the SACRED SWORD PATRIOT'S LEAGUE (SSPL) to assure that it continues to develop into a viable and creditable organization. Further, the SSPL should have for an ultimate planning goal the overthrow of the HANOI regime, with an immediate goal of peaceful replacement, to provide better direction to the Black PSYOP effort and provide the US with another means of exerting political pressure on NVN.

"RECOMMENDATION: That a long range plan be prepared for the development and growth of the SSPL, with an intermediate objective of peaceful replacement of the HANOI regime and an ultimate planning objective of overthrowing that regime.

"(c) CONCLUSION: The retention of prisoners on Paradise Island should be limited to approximately one month except in unusual circumstances such as identification and training of potential agents.

"RECOMMENDATION: The STD (VN) be convinced that retention of prisoners on Paradise Island should be limited to approximately one month.

"(d) CONCLUSION: Improved and additional means are needed by SOG PSYOP to deliver propaganda to North Vietnam.

"RECOMMENDATION That development of additional delivery systems for PSYOP be expedited and that SOG test balloon delivery of leaflets into NVN from PTFs of PLOWMAN (C) and ground locations in LAOS.

"(e) CONCLUSION: Radio coverage of NVN would be improved by the purchase of a floating station in the Gulf of TONKIN.

"RECOMMENDATION: That MACV support the purchase of a floating radio transmitter for use by SOG.

"(f) CONCLUSION: Training of SOG PSYOP personnel is not adequate for the unique mission they perform. PSYOP experienced personnel are needed who are also trained in Black PSYOP.

"RECOMMENDATION: That personnel assigned to SOG PSYOP have prior PSYOP experience and receive specialized training in Black PSYOP and SOG's mission prior to arrival in country.

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~~TOP SECRET~~"(3) TIMBERWORK (C)

"(a) CONCLUSION The long term agent/agent team program has not been overly successful in terms of intelligence collection, harassment and interdiction of LOC, and assistance to downed aircrews

"RECOMMENDATION. The TIMBERWORK (C) program be reoriented to de-emphasize the employment of long term agent/agent teams.

"(b) CONCLUSION The success of STRATA teams to date to penetrate and survive in the area of operations indicates MACSOG's plans to employ 20 teams in 1968 as being extremely ambitious.

"RECOMMENDATION. A periodic review and analysis of STRATA team program be undertaken by MACSOG to establish a realistic goal.

"(4) HEAVY HOOK AND COMBAT SPEAR OPERATIONS

"(a) CONCLUSION The current resources, both personnel and aircraft, far exceed those required to satisfy MACSOG's airlift requirements. Three C-130 mission configured aircraft can provide current and projected combat mission support, to include training flights for crew and ground teams. One C-130 standard cargo aircraft when supplemented by the one C-45 (TRADEWIND) and the one C-47 aircraft, on contract from China Airline, can provide the required logistical support for MACSOG. Better projection of logistical planning coupled with a shift to common-user airlift for for routine cargo can absorb any short-fall.

"RECOMMENDATION:

"1. One mission configured C-130 (COMBAT SPEAR) aircraft be returned to the 314th TAW and Detachment 1, 314th TAW (7AF) be provided one standard C-130 cargo aircraft as a replacement.

"2. Where possible, routine cargo should be transported by common-user airlift.



(b)(1)
(b)(3)

"(c) CONCLUSION: The 1st Flight Detachment, MACSOG, less the Air Resupply Branch, could be deactivated resulting in a manpower savings of 17 officers and 31 enlisted men.

"RECOMMENDATION: The 1st Flight Detachment, MACSOG, less the Air Resupply Branch be deactivated.

"(d) CONCLUSION: For the most efficient operations, all C-130 mission configured and cargo aircraft should be assigned to Detachment 1, 314th TAW (7AF) for the dedicated use of MACSOG with OP-32 FRAGGING 7AF mission requirements.

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C-130 mission configured cargo aircraft should be assigned to Detachment 1, 314th TAW (7AF) for the dedicated use of MACSOG with OP-32 FRAGGING 7AF mission requirements.

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"RECOMMENDATION: Four C-130 aircraft, three mission configured (COMBAT SPEAR) and one standard C-130 cargo aircraft be assigned to Detachment 1, 314th TAW (7AF) for the dedicated use of MACSOG." *

* (TS) Report, MACJ3, AHEG, "Report of AD HOC Evaluation Group"
14 Feb 1968, p. 7-11. (SACSA).

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